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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution explicitly gives 
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. I If 
Congress does not legislate in a particular substantive area 
involving interstate commerce, however, the Commerce Clause 
is silent on the extent to which States may regulate activities in 
that substantive area.2 Thus, when the U.S. Supreme Court is 
asked to define the scope of the "Dormant" Commerce Clause, it 
faces the fundamental dilemma of trying to interpret the 
meaning of congressional silence.s In interpreting this silence, 
the Court must decide between the extremes of interpreting the 
Dormant Commerce Clause on one hand as granting Congress 
exclusive power to regulate commerce 4 and, on the other hand, 
as granting States virtually unlimited power to regulate interstate 
commerce.5 The Court has responded to these uncertainties "by 
1. "The Congress shall have Power .•. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
2. Congress's power to limit impliedly state regulation of interstate commerce is 
known as the "dormant" or "negative" aspect of the Commerce Clause. 
3. See infra notes 4-5, 46, and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 227 (1824) Oohnson, j., 
concurring) (suggesting that the commerce "power must be exclusive; it can reside but 
in one potentate"). Where Congress's commerce power is exclusive, States have no right 
to regulate in any way an activity that affects interstate commerce, even if Congress 
remains silent on the particular subject matter. 
5. Some have argued that "[c]ongressional silence in any area always represent[s] an 
intent to defer to state regulation." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 282 (5th ed. 1995) (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont 
Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,587 (1852) (Taney,j., dissenting); Livingston v. Van 
Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812». Applying this approach, States would have unfettered 
power, in the absence of congressional intervention, to regulate even those activities that 
directly and significantly impact interstate commerce. Stated another way, "[w]ithout a 
dormant commerce clause, states would be free to enact legislation favoring local 
commerce and discriminating against out-of-state commerce in all cases where Congress 
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interpreting the affirmative grant of commerce powers to 
[Congress] as imposing some self-executing limitations on the 
scope of permissible state regulation.,,6 In short, the Court has 
determined that, "[i]n effect, sometimes the commerce clause is 
exclusive, and sometimes it is not.,,7 
In its current state, the Court's dormant-commerce-clause 
jurisprudence consists of "plainly manipulable and at times 
anachronistically metaphysical ... doctrines," with complex 
exceptions that are applied with only "dubious consistency."s 
The Court's doctrine has become so riddled with exceptions 
that it "often appears to turn more on ad hoc reactions to 
particular cases than on any consistent application of coherent 
principles."g Several Justices have expressed their frustrations 
with the dormant-commerce-clause doctrine, describing it at 
various times as "hopelessly confused,"lo a "quagmire,"U "not 
predictable,,12 and in a classic understatement, "not 
always ... easy to foUow."ls Commentators agree: "It seems that 
the only thing consistently predictable about the Court['s 
interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause] is its 
continued unpredictability.,,14 Why does the Court perpetuate 
such a scattered approach? One commentator speculates that 
the Supreme Court has preserved this unpredictable doctrine 
"with an eye to [its] discretionary application in order to prevent 
had not legislated on a particular matter." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 281 (citing SAUL 
LEVMORE, Interstate Exploitation andJudicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563 (1983); Martin 
H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance 
of Federalism, 1987 DUKE LJ. 569). 
6. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 281. See infra notes 57-94 and accompanying 
text. 
7. Id. at 282. 
8. LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSfITUTlONALLAw 440 (2d ed. 1988). 
9. Id. at 439. 
10. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist,J., 
dissenting) . 
11. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); see also Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 
232, 259-60 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (averring that the Court's "applications of the 
[dormant-commerce·dause] doctrine have, not to put too fine a point on the matter, 
made no sense"). 
12. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897-98 (1988) 
(Scalia,J., concurring). 
13. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987). 
14. Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LJ. 425, 479 
(1982). 
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what appear to be instances of intolerable local or state 
interference with interstate markets.,,15 
When the Court lacks a cogent, consistently applied analytical 
methodology in a substantive area of the law, the jurisprudence 
in that area is likely to be erratic. Where the Court's 
jurisprudence is erratic, there will be a large measure of 
uncertainty about how future cases in that area will be decided. 
So it is with the Court's current dormant-commerce-clause 
jurisprudence. The lack of a coherent dormant-commerce-
clause doctrine leaves individual States with much uncertainty 
about how far they may go in regulating activities that might 
implicate interstate commerce. Under the current doctrine, 
lawmakers and others at the state level are left with far too little 
idea of which state laws will and which will not withstand judicial 
scrutiny. This lack of predictability hinders States' efforts to 
regulate matters within their own borders, thus potentially 
disturbing in a basic sense their sovereignty.16 A State that is 
uncertain about the limits of its authority in regulating activities 
that might affect interstate commerce may be hesitant to enact 
novel and possibly visionary lawsl7 out of fear that they will be 
struck down in court. IS Or, on the other hand, a State might 
IS. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 440. 
16. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much: An Examination of 
Commerce Clausejurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 47, 61 (1981). Maltz notes that 
[a]lthough the tenn "state sovereignty" is never directly mentioned in the 
Constitution, the policy of maintaining the quasi-sovereign status of the states is 
implicit not only in the tenth amendment, but also in the entire federal 
structure of American government. Thus, in commerce clause litigation, a state 
decision that implicates concerns close to the core of the sovereignty concept 
should at least arguably be entitled to greater deference. 
ld. 
17. See infra note 47 and accompanying text for Justice Brandeis's eloquent statement 
regarding the dangers of discouraging state experimentation. 
One might argue that to the extent that "novel and possibly visionary laws" happen to 
be unconstitutional, such a chilling effect on the State may not be such a bad thing. See 
Letter from Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., to the author (January 23, 1997) (on file with 
author). Although there is a certain logic to this argument, this Article maintains that 
greater certainty and clarity in themselves are virtues. Indeed, "clarity is a virtue that 
cannot be valued too much in constitutional law." Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Donnant 
Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 125, 150. 
18. Certainly, the same could be said if the Court had in place a cogent methodology 
consistently applied-that is, that the State would not enact novel or even visionary laws 
that it felt relatively certain would fail the Court's test. It is not in the easy cases where the 
certainty would make a difference. Rather, the certainty engendered by a consistently 
applied, coherent methodology would have its greatest effect in the marginal cases-
those cases where it is a closer question whether a state measure unacceptably regulates 
interstate commerce. And, of course, some uncertainty will remain even with the clearest 
of methodologies. Indeed, retaining at least a minimum of flexibility is desirable; the 
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blindly proceed in enacting a law that unacceptably regulates 
interstate commerce when it might have been dissuaded from 
proceeding had it known with greater certainty what the Court's 
position would be on the matter. Either way, if the State has the 
benefit of a cogent, consistently applied analytical framework 
within which to test its legislation, it can decide with greater 
confidence whether or not to proceed. 
Clearly, a dormant-commerce-clause approach that is more 
coherent and functionally consolidated than the Court's 
sometimes scattered approach would be helpful. Currently, 
however, there is no one analytical framework that adequately 
consolidates the Court's dormant-commerce-clause 
jurisprudence into a coherent whole.19 This Article proposes 
such a cohesive approach with its new "Unitary Framework.,,20 
The Unitary Framework does just what its name suggests-it 
incorporates the various dormant-commerce-clause principles 
laid out by the Coure l and leading scholarly works and 
consolidates them into a hybrid unitary taxonomy suitable for 
use with both existing and prospective cases. The Unitary 
Framework is not a reform proposal as such, supported by a 
normative theory; rather, it is a distillation of the hidden order 
reflected in the Supreme Court's current approach to 
Court must have the discretion to consider the unique case-specific facts in determining 
the constitutionality of a given statute. 
19. A number of important scholarly works have addressed various aspects of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause and have factored into the overall development and 
structure of this Article's Unitary Framework. Among those that factor most prominendy 
are: Eule, supra note 14; Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Donnant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986); and Tushnet, supra 
note 17. 
20. This Article's Unitary Framework has been well "road-tested." After introdUcing 
and discussing the prevailing dormant-commerce-clause doctrine in my Constitutional 
Law I classes, it became clear that the doctrine was indeed, in the words of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, "hopelessly confused." Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 
662,706 (1981) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). Students in the classes were befuddled by the 
multiplicity and complexity of the rules and exceptions in the dormant-commerce-clause 
materials. This Article's Unitary Framework springs from efforts over time to find some 
order in what appears to be a chaotic jurisprudence and to develop a new, more 
coherent way of presenting the material. It has been gratifying to observe that student 
comprehension of the material has gready increased as a result of students' use of the 
Unitary Framework. 
21. Beyond the occasional cursory comment, this Article takes the Coun's 
jurisprudence as it finds it. The Article's primary purpose is not to argue the substantive 
merits of more or less congressional commerce power vis-a-vis the power of the States to 
regulate interstate commerce; those arguments will be saved for another day. To the 
extent this Article comes down one way or the other on the matter, however, it finds 
especially persuasive the arguments of those advocating a limited judicial role in 
dormant-commerce-clause cases. See infra notes 31-54 and accompanying text. 
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dormant-commerce-clause questions.22 Specifically, the Unitary 
Framework involves two major levels of inquiry: (1) whether the 
state statute or regulation at issue pursues a legitimate state 
purpose; and, if so, (2) whether this legitimate state purpose is 
so outweighed by the burdens imposed by the statute on 
interstate commerce that the statute must be struck down. 
By consolidating the Court's array of dormant-commerce-
clause pronouncements and leading scholarly commentary on 
the subject under one roof, the Unitary Framework brings 
order--and improved certainty and predictability-to this 
currently muddled area. At the same time, the Unitary 
Framework retains the flexibility to allow for a particularized 
approach with adequate sensitivity to factual nuance-an 
important characteristic for any framework if it is to useful to 
courts, which need to retain discretion to consider the unique 
circumstances of individual cases.23 
This Article proceeds in stages. Part II provides an historical 
look at the development of the Constitution and the Commerce 
Clause, with a special eye toward federalism and separation-of-
powers issues. In particular, this Part looks at the judiciary's role 
in regulating the impact of state actions under the Commerce 
Clause. Part III discusses the Dormant Commerce Clause-the 
Commerce Clause's implied restriction on States from 
regulating interstate commerce.24 Part IV introduces and 
develops this Article's "Unitary Framework" for use in analyzing 
current and prospective dormant-commerce-clause cases. This 
22. This point is illustrated by the facts that: (a) the Unitary Framework "tra"ks the 
Coun's formulae pretty closely; and (b) most if not all of the cases discuss[ed] come out 
the same way as the Coun decided them." E-mail letter from Professor Richard Fallon to 
the author (September 19, 1997) (on file with author). 
23. This Article does not presume to argue that the Unitary Framework will provide a 
quick-fix for every dormant-commerce-clause case. As noted by one commentator, 
[t]he general problem we are addressing has resisted the best efforts of the 
Supreme Coun (for over 150 years) ..• and a host of talented legal scholars. 
The reason, we believe, is that in some ultimate sense the problem is 
unsolvable. Taken to their logical conclusion, either free trade or local 
autonomy could vinually eliminate the other, and negotiating a workable 
border between the two depends as much on history, politics, and local terrain 
as on any overarching vision. No matter how a legal test is articulated, it cannot 
satisfactorily resolve the tensions between local autonomy and free trade in all 
conceivable cases. In the end, the law must have a cenain irreducible messiness 
in dealing with such fundamental tensions. 
Daniel A. Farber & Roben E. Hudec, Free Trade and the &gulalory State: A GATT's·Eye View 
ojtheDonnant Commerce Clause, 47VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1438 (1994). 
24. The Constitution's explicit grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce is sometimes termed the "active" Commerce Clause. 
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Part discusses the Court's existing dormant-commerce-clause 
jurisprudence in the context of the Unitary Framework, 
demonstrating the Unitary Framework's practical application 
and utility in bringing order to the Court's dormant-commerce-
clause doctrine. 
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: BACKGROUND 
A. Federalism and the Constitution 
A primary task of the Framers at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1789 was deciding how power should be allocated 
between the federal and state governments.25 The balance of 
power that ultimately resulted from the Constitutional 
Convention can be viewed conceptually as two sides of the same 
coin. On one side, the Constitution gives the national 
government specifically enumerated powers.26 Most of 
25. The impetus for the Convention was the belief held by many that the original 
Articles of Confederation were inadequate because they gave too little power to the 
national government to control trade wars among the States. See Eule, supra note 14, at 
430 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (stating that commercial 
warfare among the States "threatened both the viability and peace of the union, and is 
almost uniformly conceded to be the primary, if not sole, catalyst for the convention of 
1787"); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949); Robert L. Stem, 
That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1335, 1338 (1934». 
Specifically, the Articles of Confederation provided for only a Congress-that is, there 
was no executive and no significant federal judiciary-and, for its part, Congress was 
something of a paper tiger because of its inability to tax and its dependence upon the 
States for its funding. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 138. That said, the 
Framers in no way were interested in vesting unlimited power in the national 
government. Rather, they envisioned a federalist system, a system where power would be 
divided among the state and federal governments so as to allow the inherent benefits of 
both while preventing either from oppressing the other. 
26. The Constitution also gives Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the [enumerated powers of Article I, § 
8,] and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
James Madison suggested that the Necessary and Proper Clause might be structurally 
unnecessary: 
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all 
the particular powers, requisite as means of executing the general powers, 
would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom 
is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is 
required, the means are authorised; wherever a general power ·to do a thing is 
given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Professor 
Tribe, however, suggests that even if the Necessary and Proper Clause is structurally 
superfluous, it remains important as an explicit incorporation within the language of the 
Constitution of the doctrine of implied power: "The exercise by Congress of power ancillary to 
an enumerated source of national authority is constitutionaUy valid, so long as the ancillary power 
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Congress's powers are enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution.27 The decision by the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention to give Congress specific, 
enumerated powers, rather than a broad, inclusive power, was in 
keeping with the Articles of Confederation, which gave Congress 
certain enumerated powers in Article IX.2B In a textual sense, 
then, Congress's commerce power is limited to those activities 
expressed or implied within the text of the Constitution. On the 
other side, pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution 
makes state actions valid as a matter of law-in effect, it gives 
state actions a presumption of validity-unless expressly or 
impliedly prohibited by the Constitution.29 
The Court succinctly explained the advantages of the 
federalist system of shared powers and dual sovereignty in the 
1991 case of Gregory v. Ashcroft. 
It assures a decentralized government that will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it 
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation 
in government; and it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry .... 
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a 
check on abuses of government power.... Just as the 
separation and independence of the coordinate Branches of 
does not conflict with external limitations such as those of the Bill of Rights and of federalism. " 
TRIBE, supra note 8, at 301 (emphasis in original). 
27. Among the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 are the power to lay and 
collect taxes (Clause 1); to borrow money on behalf of the United States (Clause 2); to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, the States, and Indian tribes (Clause 3); to coin 
money (Clause 5); to establish post offices (Clause 7); to provide protections to authors 
and inventors (Clause 8); to establish lower federal courts (Clause 9); to declare war 
(Clause 11); to establish and regulate military forces (Clauses 12-16); and to make laws 
"necessary and proper" for implementing all of the other enumerated powers in Article 
I, Section 8 (Clause 18). 
28. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX. Article IX did not grant Congress the power 
to tax or the power to regulate commerce; these omissions, many believe, led to the need 
for the Constitutional Convention in the first place. See supra note 25 and accompanying 
text. 
29. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment, although reserving 
significant power to the States, does not approach the broad power given by Article II of 
the Articles of Confederation, which reserved to the States "every power, jurisdiction, and 
right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States." 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. The "expressly delegated" language of the Articles 
of Confederation gave the States significantly broader power than they enjoy presently 
under the Tenth Amendment. 
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the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation 
of excessive power in anyone Branch, a healthy balance of 
power between the States and the Federal government will 
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front. 30 
B. The Judiciary's Role 
This Article's primary purpose is to provide a coherent 
analytical framework for a constitutional provision that is not 
really there-that is, the Dormant Commerce Clause's limitation 
on state regulation of interstate commerce, a limitation not 
expressly stated in the text, but found by the Court to be implied 
by the text and structureSl of the Constitution.32 By what 
authority does the Court make such determinations in the first 
place? 
Ever since Marbury v. Madison,33 the Court has assumed an 
active role in interpreting the Constitution and "say[ing] what 
the law is.,,34 Some suggest, however, that the role of regulating 
the impact of state actions under the Commerce Clause is a task 
better left to Congress than to the judiciary. Justice Scalia in 
particular is a proponent of this view. He notes "the lack of any 
clear theoretical underpinning for judicial 'enforcement' of the 
Commerce Clause" and suggests that the proper reading of the 
Commerce Clause is as "a charter for Congress, not the courts, 
to ensure 'an area of trade free from interference by the 
States. ,,,35 Further: 
[T] 0 the extent that we have gone beyond guarding against 
rank discrimination against citizens of other States-which is 
regulated not by the Commerce Clause but by the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause ... the Court for over a century has 
engaged in an enterprise that it has been unable to justify by 
textual support or even coherent non textual theory, that it 
30. 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
31. See infra note 51. 
32. See infra notes 57-88 and accompanying text. 
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
34. [d. at 177. Chief Justice John Marshall explained that "it is, emphatically, the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. Further, "[t]he 
judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the 
constitution." [d. at 178. 
35. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1987) 
(Scalia,j., dissenting) (quoting Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 
318,328 (1977». 
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was almost certainly not intended to undertake, and that it 
has not undertaken very well.s6 
Finally,Justice Scalia argues that 
a state statute is invalid under the Commerce Clause if, and 
only if, it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate 
commerce in a respect not required to achieve a lawful state 
purpose. When such a validating purpose exists, it is for 
Congress and not [the Court] to determine it is not 
significant enough to justify the burden on commerce.S7 
This viewpoint has roots in earlier Commerce Clause 
decisions. In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell 
Brothers, Inc.,sa for example, the Court unanimously sustained a 
South Carolina statute imposing height and weight restrictions 
on trucks traveling within the State, asserting that it is Congress's 
responsibility, and not the Court's, to determine when "local 
interests should be required to yield to the national authority 
and interest.... [C]ourts do not sit as legislatures."s9 
Specifically, 
[s]ince the adoption of one weight or width regulation, 
rather than another, is a legislative not a judicial choice, its 
constitutionality is not to be determined by weighing in the 
judicial scales the merits of the legislative choice and 
rejecting it if the weight of evidence presented in court 
appears to favor a different standard.40 
In other words, "[C]ourts are not any the more entitled, because 
interstate commerce is affected, to substitute their own for the 
legislative judgment.,,41 
For his part, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that 
[t] he wisdom of a messianic insistence on a grim sink-or-swim 
policy of laissez-faire economics would be debatable had 
Congress chosen to enact it; but Congress has done nothing 
of the kind. It is the Court which has imposed the policy 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, a policy which bodes 
36. ld. at 265 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
'37. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc. 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988). 
38. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
39. ld. at 190. 
40. ldat 191. 
41. ld. 
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ill for the values of federalism which have long animated our 
constitutional jurisprudence. 42 
Justice Rehnquist adds that 
[t]he Commerce Clause is, after all, a grant of authority to 
Congress, not to the courts. Although the Court when it 
interprets the "dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause will 
invalidate unwarranted state intrusion, such action is a far cry 
from simply undertaking to regulate when Congress has not 
because we believe such regulation would facilitate interstate 
43 
commerce. 
A key element of this viewpoint, of course, is the belief that 
States have the right in the first place to regulate, in a 
nonprotectionist manner, activities impacting interstate 
commerce in the absence of congressional action.44 Justice Scalia 
suggests that "the language of the Commerce. Clause gives no 
indication of exclusivity,"45 and concludes that "[t]here is no 
conceivable reason why congressional inaction under the 
Commerce Clause should be deemed to have the same pre-
emptive effect elsewhere accorded only congressional action. 
There, as elsewhere, 'Congress' silence. is just that-
silence .... ,,,46 This State-oriented approach has certain real 
advantages. As argued by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting 
opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 
[t]o stay experimentation in things social and economic is a 
grave responsibility. Denial of the rights to experiment may 
be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
42. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 217 (1994) (Rehnquist, CJ., 
dissenting). The Court in West Lynn Creamery struck down a Massachusetts tax-subsidy 
program that imposed a tax on all milk sold by dealers to Massachusetts retailers and 
distributed the revenues exclusively to Massachusetts dairy farmers. See infra notes 291-95 
and accompanying text. 
43. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 690 (1981) (Rehnquist,J., 
dissenting) . 
44. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
45. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (1987) 
(Scalia,j., dissenting).justice Scalia argues that 
[nlor can one assume generally that Congress' Article I powers are exclusive; 
many of them plainly coexist with concurrent authority in the States. 
Furthermore, there is no correlative denial of power over commerce to the 
States in Art. I, §10, as there is, for example, with the power to coin money or 
make treaties. And both the States and Congress assumed from the date of 
ratification that at least some state laws regulating commerce were valid. 
Id. (Scalia,j., dissenting). 
46. Id. at 262 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 
678,686 (1987». 
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courageous State may, if its citizens choose, sexve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.47 
A number of modem commentators have argued this 
viewpoint as well. For example, Professor Tushnet suggests that 
"the role played by the courts should be far smaller than it has 
been. Congressional action, buttressed by judicial intervention 
in those limited circumstances where Congress is unlikely to act, 
will protect all interests worthy of consideration."48 Judicial 
displacement of a State's legislation is called for only "when it 
seems that the legislative 'process has operated in a distorted 
way-for example, by excluding some affected interest from 
influence on the legislative process.,,49 Steven Breker-Cooper 
bases his approach on democratic theory, arguing that 
[b]y intexvening when Congress has not acted, the Court 
allows two separate political branches to evade electoral 
accountability: the state legislature which passes a statute that 
burdens interstate commerce, and Congress which does 
nothing about it. Congress and state legislatures should be 
forced to implement positive policy, rather than lying 
dormant, secure in the knowledge that the Court will 
implement policies that Congress should have enacted, or, in 
the case of state lwslatures, strike down policies they should 
not have enacted. 
Other modem commentators disagree, arguing that the idea 
of a strong congressional dormant-commerce-clause power to 
limit States is justified on structural grounds,51 even if it is not 
justified on textual and historical grounds. One influential jurist 
has described the negative commerce clause as "one 
device ... for preventing states from abusing their 'market 
power,'" which protects against the "danger that, like 
independent nations, states might be pressured by interest 
47. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
48. Tushnet, supra note 17, at 125-26. 
49. Id. at 125. 
50. Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non·lnteroention, 69 
OR. L. REv. 895,935-36 (1990). 
51. Structural reasoning in constitutional argument and decision making deals with 
"the interrelationships among the institutions created or recognized by the Constitution, 
the goals behind the manner in which they are supposed to relate, and sometimes the 
individual interests affected by those patterns." MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS D. 
ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 129 (1993). Such 
reasoning "involves drawing inferences from the governmental structures and 
relationships created by the Constitution." Id. 
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groups to establish trade barriers" against out-of-state 
commerce.
52 Another commentator asserts that the Constitution 
in general reflects a "compromise between unlimited state 
autonomy and perfect national unity',53 and that this 
compromise is "no doubt the strongest argument for forbidding 
state protectionism.,,54 
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: THE IMPLIED 
LIMITATION ON STATE REGULATION OF MATTERS INVOLVING 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
It is analytically convenient to consider two separate aspects of 
the Commerce Clause: (1) the grant of power to Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce; and (2) the implied limitation55 
on States from regulating matters that interfere with interstate 
commerce-the so-called "Dormant" Commerce Clause.56 This 
Article concerns the latter. 
A. History 
The Supreme Court's earliest consideration of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause came in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden,S7 a case that 
also considered the extent of Congress's regulatory power under 
52. Richard Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 4, 
17 (1987). 
53. Regan, supra note 19, at 1091. 
54. ld. at 1111. 
55. Although the Commerce Clause is phrased as an affirmative grant of power to 
Congress, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text, nowhere does the Constitution 
explicitly limit state interference with interstate commerce. It is important to note that 
because any constitutional limitations on state regulation of interstate commerce are 
implied, rather than expressly stated, any Supreme Coun limitation (or grant) of such 
state power is subject to congressional revision. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 
(1890) (stating that a State may not ban the sale of liquor from another State unless 
Congress were to pass a law allowing States to do so) (note that Congress thereafter 
enacted the Wilson Act (26 Stat. 313 (1890», providing that States could regulate the 
transpon ofliquors into a State). 
56. James Madison actually regarded the "negative" aspect of the Commerce Clause-
the implied restriction on States from regulating interstate commerce-as the more 
important, writing that the Commerce Clause "grew out of the abuse of the power by the 
importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and 
preventive provision against iIliustice among the States themselves, rather than as a 
power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government." 3 MAx FARRAND, 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, 478 (1911), quoted in West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994). 
57. 22 U.S. (9Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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the "active" Commerce Clause.58 In Gibbons, Chief Justice John 
Marshall examined the individual words and phrases of the 
Commerce Clause and concluded that the Commerce Clause 
gives Congress broad plenary power to regulate commercial 
intercourse having any interstate impact, however indirect.59 As 
such, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that Congress's power to 
regulate interstate commerce is virtually unlimited, subject only 
to the Constitution's affirmative prohibitions on the exercise of 
federal authority. 
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall considered, but did not 
definitively decide, whether Congress's power to regulate 
interstate commerce was exclusive-that is, whether, in the 
absence of congressional action, a State could regulate a certain 
activity impacting interstate commerce. On one hand, Chief 
Justice Marshall noted that there is "great force,,60 in the 
argument that States have no right to regulate activities affecting 
interstate commerce because "the word 'to regulate' implies in 
its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, [and thus] 
excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform 
the same operation on the same thing.,,61 Indeed, when a State 
regulates commerce with foreign nations or among the several 
States, "it is exercising the very power that is granted to 
Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is 
authorized to do.,,62 On the other hand, Chief Justice Marshall 
58. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
59. Chief justice Marshall broadly defined "commerce" as any activity involving 
commercial intercourse (including navigation, the activity at issue in Gibbons); thus, 
commerce goes well beyond the mere buying and selling or interchange of commodities. 
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189. He then considered what the Commerce Clause 
means when it says that Congress has the power to regulate "among the several States" 
and determined that Congress can regulate even those activities that are primarily 
intrastate in nature if those activities affect commerce with other States and if such 
regulation is necessary to execute the general powers of the national government. See id. 
at 195. Under this reading, only that commerce that is exclusively internal to a State and 
that affects no other State would be out of Congress's reach. See id. Finally, Chief justice 
Marshall defined "regulate" as "the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to 
be governed." Id. at 196. This power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost 
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." 
Id. 
60. Id. at 209. 
61. Id. Chief justice Marshall stated that he was not convinced that the strong 
argument in favor of congressional exclusivity was refuted. See id. justice johnson was 
more emphatic: the commerce "power must be exclusive; it can reside in but one 
potentate." Id. at 227 (Johnson,j., concurring). 
62. Id. at 199-200 (majority opinion). Chief justice Marshall contrasted Congress's 
power to lay and collect taxes, which "has never been understood to interfere with the 
exercise of the same power by the States" because "neither is exercising the power of the 
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suggested that States may sometimes enact laws to regulate 
commerce, as long as the regulation does not interfere with, or 
is not contrary to, an Act of Congress passed pursuant to the 
Constitution.63 In Gibbons, because there was indeed actual 
conflict betv{een the state law at issue and an Act of Congress, it 
was unnecessary to reach the question of how far a State may go 
in regulating interstate commerce in the absence of 
congressional action, and Chief Justice Marshall left it 
unanswered. 
Thereafter, when Congress failed to act in a number of areas, 
the Court developed various mechanisms to uphold States' 
rights to regulate certain activities that might be found to affect 
interstate commerce. In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh CO.,54 for 
example, the Court held that in the absence of a conflicting Act 
of Congress, States may regulate pursuant to the police power 
activities affecting interstate commerce;65 and in the License 
Cases,66 the Court held that in cases of necessity, long usage, and 
. S gul' 67 Th acqUIescence, tates may re ate mterstate commerce. en, 
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 58 the Court 
attempted to merge its previous dormant-commerce-clause 
holdings into a single doctrine standing for the proposition that, 
in the absence of conflicting congressional action, States may 
regulate those aspects of interstate commerce that are so local as 
to require diverse treatment, whereas Congress alone may 
regulate those aspects of the same that require a single, uniform 
rule.69 
other," ill. at 198, 199, and thus concluded that the commerce power cannot be 
analogized to the taxing power. See id. at 200. 
63. See ill. at 209-10. 
64. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). 
65. In WUlson, the Court upheld a Delaware statute allowing the damming of a marshy 
creek, notwithstanding the fact that such damming blocked federally licensed boating. 
See ill. at 252; see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (upholding a Virginia 
statute regulating out-of-state insurance companies, reasoning that the act of issuing an 
insurance policy does not constitute an interstate commercial transaction), C1IJerruled by 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (finding that the 
act of underwriting insurance does constitute interstate commerce); Coe v. Town of Errol, 
116 U.S. 517 (1886) (upholding New Hampshire tax on cut logs, holding that mere 
intent to export does not constitute interstate commerce). 
66. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). In these cases, the Court upheld various state laws 
requiring licenses for the sale of intOxicating liquor. One of the License Cases, Pierce v. New 
Hampshire, was overruled by Leisj v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). 
67. In so holding, the Court necessarily found that Congress's power to regulate 
interstate commerce was 1UIt exclusive. See License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 579. 
68. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
69. See ill. at 320. 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 410 1997-1998
410 Haroard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 21 
The local-national subject distinction as laid out in Cooley has 
been minimized due to the lack of adequate criteria for 
determining what matters are "national" as opposed to "local" in 
character and because the subject of a regulation is not the sole 
meaningful determinant in deciding whether a uniform national 
rule as opposed to a diversified local approach is needed-that 
is, a regulation's purpose and effect are also relevant in 
determining how extensively the regulation affects interstate 
commerce.
70 The Court's reasoning in Cooley endures, however, 
in the sense that the resolution of a particular case today will 
tum in large part on a consideration of the local (state) interest 
in regulating local affairs as it relates to the national interest in 
• • 71 promotmg mterstate commerce. 
Replacing the Cooley local-national subject distinction in the 
Supreme Court's late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century 
decisions was the distinction between state regulations having a 
"direct" and "indirect" effect on interstate commerce. Those 
state regulations that directly affected interstate commerce were 
held to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause,72 whereas those 
that "only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely" affected 
interstate commerce were held to be acceptable.73 Then, by the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, the Court had rejected the direct-
indirect distinction in favor of a methodology that persists to this 
day-a balancing of the State's interest in enforcing a state 
70. Cj. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 408 (stating that, in the years following Cooley, "[w]hat the 
states did, and not what subject they did it to, came to be seen as the crucial question in 
deciding whether state action was compatible with the commerce clause"). 
71. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 437 ("[I]t is plain that those state regulations provoked 
by purely local aspects of interstate commerce are accorded a deference not granted to 
state actions stimulated by problems of more obviously national dimension."). 
72. See, e.g., DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (holding that because a 
state law requiring licensing of steamboat ticket sellers was a "direct burden" on 
interstate commerce, Congress had exclusive authority to regulate the activity, and the 
state law was hence unconstitutional); see also Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 
310 (1917) (striking down a state law requiring trains to stop at public crossings as many 
as 124 times within 123 miles). But seeSouthem Railway Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910) 
(upholding a state law requiring trains to slow down at fewer crossings). 
73. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) (upholding a state train-engineer 
licensing law); accord Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 283 U.S. 
380 (1931) (upholding a state law requiring that interstate carriers construct a union 
passenger station); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911) 
(upholding a state law requiring three brakemen on longer freight trains); Erb v. 
Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900) (upholding a local ordinance restricting train speed while 
within city limits). 
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regulation against the burden the regulation imposes on 
. ~ 
mterstate commerce. 
The development of the Court's modern dormant-commerce-
clause doctrine7s has been guided by two theories operating 
either individually or in tandem. One theory is that the purpose 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause is to provide an economic 
blueprint for the nation's economic functioning. The second 
theory is that the purpose of the Clause is to fulfill a political 
vision of a federal government responsive to the needs of all 
citizens while at the same time respecting and honoring the 
institutional interests of the States.76 
The economic-blueprint theory is based on the notion that 
protectionist state laws "interfere with the efficient disposition of 
resources throughout the country. By excluding some 
commerce from a State, these statutes may lead to a lower level 
of economic performance than would be possible in the absence 
of the statutes."" In the words of another commentator, "[t]he 
recognition of the framers' goal of establishing a unified, 
national economy has permeated judicial interpretations of the 
commerce clause.,,78 As recently articulated by the Court, "[t]he 
74. The practice of using the "balancing test" as the analytical touchstone in donnant-
commerce-clause cases has its roots in the dissent in DiSantc, see supra note 72 and 
accompanying text, in which Justice Stone observed: 
[T]he traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the 
interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, 
too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value. 
In this making use of the expressions, "direct" and "indirect interference" with 
commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather 
than any trustworthy fonnula by which it is reached .... 
[I]t seems clear that those interferences not deemed forbidden are to be 
sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect, but 
because a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of 
the regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and the 
actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to the conclusion that the 
regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national 
interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines. 
DiSanto, 273 U.S. at 44 (Stone,J., dissenting); see also Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce 
and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940). Professor Dowling argued that the Coun should 
bring out into the open what it had really been attempting to do all along: "deliberately 
balancing national and local interest and making a choice as to which of the two should 
prevail." Id. at 21. 
75. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
76. SeeGEOFFREYR STONEET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 293-94 (3rd ed. 1996). 
77. Id. at 293. 
78. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 283. Further, "[t]he Coun has recognized, 
for the most part, that the rationale of the commerce clause was to create and foster the 
development of a common market among the States, eradicating internal trade barriers, 
and prohibiting the economic Balkanization of the Union." Id. at 282. In adopting this 
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central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to 
prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic 
protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and 
retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.'t79 
The political-vision theory is based on the principle that, 
above all, individual residents of the several States are citizens of 
a nation, and that some state statutes are incompatible with this 
ideal.80 According to the Court, the Constitution "was framed 
upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink 
or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and 
salvation are in union and not division."S! Any state commercial 
regulation that discriminates in favor of an in-state resident at 
the expense of an out-of-state resident is thus viewed critically.82 
As the Court noted in a 1938 case, 
state regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose 
purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an 
advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden those 
out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those 
within, have been thought to impinge upon the 
constitutional prohibition even though Congress has not 
acted.53 
Underlying the Court's approach in this field is the notion 
that "to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on 
interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the 
operation of those political restraints normally exerted when 
rationale, the Court has looked to the problems experienced by the States before the 
Constitutional Convention as justification for prohibiting discriminatory state measures 
that might cause the country to turn into a collection of separate nation-states trying to 
exploit and rival each other economically. 
79. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):jA1>1ES 
MADISON, Vicer of the Political System of the United States, reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 362-63 (G. Hunt ed., 1901». 
80. See STONE ET AL., supra note 76, at 293. 
81. Baldwin v. GAF. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935); see also infra notes 237-42 
and accompanying text. 
82. Some, however, including justice Scalia, disagree with the Court's practice of using 
the Commerce Clause as justification for striking down discriminatory state laws, arguing 
instead that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV offers such protection. See 
supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text; see also Eule, supra note 14, at 428, 446-55 
("proffer£ing] a radically diminished role for both the Dormant Commerce Clause and 
the Court as its interpreter"). 
83. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-
85 n.2 (1938). 
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interests within the state are affected."s4 In other words, the 
Court will view critically any regulation that does not allow those 
primarily affected by the regulation to register their approval or 
disapproval about the measure through the political process 
directly byvoting.85 
Moreover, to the extent that Congress's intervention in 
matters of interstate commerce threatens the autonomy of 
individual States, the Court has reasoned that States are 
adequately protected by the political structure of the 
government itself.86 In the Court's words, "State sovereign 
interests are more properly protected by procedural safeguards 
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially 
created limitations on the federal power."S7 The Court notes that 
the effectiveness of the political process in protecting the States' 
interest is evident from the fact that States have been able to 
receive substantial federal monies in the form of specific and 
general grants through the federal legislative process. It 
concludes that substantive limitations on Congress's commerce 
power "must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in 
the national political process [to protect against violations of 
state sovereignty] rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of 
state autonomy' [for example, under the Tenth Amendment] .,,88 
84. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945); see also Barnwell Bros., 
303 U.S. at 185 n.2 (stating that "when the [state] regulation is of such a character that 
its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to 
be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where 
it affects adversely some interests within the state"). 
85. See generally, Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of the Inner Political Check, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, and Federal Preemption, 53 TRANsp. PRAC.]. 263 (1986). 
86. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985) 
(noting that "the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to 
protect the States from overreaching by Congress"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 
291 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
87. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. Specifically, the Constitution gi,ves the States a role in the 
selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. 
The States were vested with indirect influence over the House of Representatives and the 
presidency by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in presidential 
elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. II, § 1. 
88. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,'236 (1983»; see 
generally Martha A. Field, Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Autlwrity: 
TheDemiseofaMisguidedDoctrine, 99 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1985). 
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B. The Modern Approach 
It is difficult to ascertain precisely the Court's current 
approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause.89 Much of the 
scholarly analysis of the Court's current dormant-commerce-
clause jurisprudence classifies the cases into categories 
according to the subject matter affected by the state regulation 
at issue. Under this approach, the Court's analysis of the various 
cases presumably depends at least in part upon the substantive 
category into which the case is placed. 
That the analytical approach used by the Court should 
depend upon the substantive area affected creates the possibility 
for confusion. Further complicating the matter, however, is the 
fact that the authorities do not agree on what should be the 
proper substantive categories. For instance, one influential 
constitutional law treatise discusses the cases according to 
whether the state measures involve, for example, transportation; 
limits on incoming commerce; restrictions on outgoing 
commerce; or hindrances of personal mobility.90 By contrast, a 
seminal constitutional law hornbook provides the following 
categories of state measures that might implicate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: restrictions on access to local markets; 
restrictions on access to local transportation facilities; 
restrictions on access to local resources; restrictions that put 
pressure on out-of-state businesses to relocate within the State; 
state ownership of natural resources; or regulations discouraging 
multi-state business structures.91 Finally, a popular law-school 
casebook breaks its treatment of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
into sections depending upon, among other factors, whether the 
state regulation involves transportation (and if so, whether such 
transportation regulation is designed to protect safety); whether 
the state regulation involves production and trade; whether the 
regulation involves state quarantine and inspection laws; 
whether the regulation requires business operations to be 
performed in the home State; whether the regulation is 
89. In addition to lacking a clear methodology that can be consistently applied in case 
after case, see infra Part IV, the Court has been inconsistent in its statements regarding 
how the various types of discrimination (that is, discriminatory purpose, discriminatory 
effect, and facial discrimination) should be analyzed. See infra note 109 and 
accompanying text. 
90. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 284-302. 
91. See TRiBE, supra note 8, at 413-36. 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 415 1997-1998
No.2] Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause 415 
designed to preserve resources for in-state consumption; and 
whether the regulation is designed to limit business entry or 
personal mobility.92 To be sure, there is overlap in these 
authorities' classifications, and commentators in fact adopt a 
"unitary approach" of sorts to the extent that they condemn 
discrimination generally, but it quickly becomes clear upon even 
a cursory study of these sources that there is much divergence of 
opinion on how best to describe the Court's current dormant-
commerce-clause methodology. 
As it stands today, it is difficult to know with any certainty what 
approach the Court will use in viewing a particular state measure 
potentially affecting interstate commerce.93 The nub of the 
matter is that the Court's current approach to dormant-
commerce-clause cases is so scattered that nobody-not state 
legislators, not law students, not the academic authorities, not 
the lower courts, nor, indeed, the Court itself.-knows clearly 
what the Court's rules are concerning the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.94 
IV. A NEW UNITARY FRAMEWORK 
This Article introduces and develops a "Unitary Framework" 
for dormant-commerce-clause cases.95 Under the Unitary 
Framework, it is not necessary to first classify the cases according 
to the subject matter affected by a particular state measure.96 It is 
irrelevant whether the subject matter affected is transportation, 
restrictions on location of business, incoming commerce, 
quarantines, outgoing commerce, or whatever-the same 
92. See WILLIAM COHEN & ]ONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSflTUTIONAL LAw 251-338 (10th 
ed.1997). 
93. "[T]he outcome of any particular still-undecided issue under the current 
[dormant-commerce-clause] methodology is in my view not predictable." Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897-98 (1988) (Scalia,]., concurring); 
see also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (describing the Coun's current dormant-commerce-clause approach as "a 
quagmire"); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (asserting 
that the Court's dormant-commerce-clause methodology has "not always been easy to 
follow"); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, 
]., dissenting) (complaining that "the jurisprudence of the 'negative side' of the 
Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused"); Eule, supra note 14, at 479 (stating 
that "lilt seems that the only thing consistently predictable about the Coun is its 
continued unpredictability"). 
94. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92. 
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general analytical approach will apply. When measured against 
the template of the Unitary Framework, some state regulations 
will survive, and others will drop out as impermissibly 
discriminatory against interstate commerce. 
The Unitary Framework exposes the hidden order of the 
Court's dormant-commerce-clause jurisprudence and 
consolidates it into one functionally coherent, consistent 
approach, expressed by the following flowchart: 
Stage 1: Legitimate State Purpose 
Inquiry: Does the measure pursue a legitimate (that is, 
nondiscriminatory) state purpose? (The state 
measure is presumed valid; the challenger has the 
burden of showing a discriminatory purpose.) 
a. If YES, proceed to Stage 2. 
b. If NO, measure is absolutely per se invalid an 
struck down; inquiry is ended. 
Stage 2: Balancing 
Inquiry: As applied, is the measure unacceptably 
discriminatory in effect (first, to determine burden 
of proof, ask if the measure is evenhanded in 
application or discriminatory in application) ?97 Is 
the measure discriminatory on its face? 
a. If EVENHANDED IN APPLICATION, the 
measure is presumed valid; the challenger has 
the burden of proving that the measure's 
burden on interstate commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to state benefits. 
b. If DISCRIMINATORY IN APPLICATION, the 
measure is presumed invalid. 
97. When the Unitary Framework speaks of statutes that are "evenhanded in 
application," it refers to laws that apply to in-staters and out-of-staters equally, without 
regard to their in-state or out-of-state status; when it speaks of statutes "discriminatory in 
application," the Framework refers to those that by their nature apply to a greater degree 
to out-of-staters than to in-staters. To be sure, although an evenhanded statute may apply 
equally to in-staters and out-of-staters, it can often affect out-of-staters disproportionately 
if in-state interests have adapted to the statute in some way that out-of-state interests have 
not. This adaptation by in-state interests to the statute does not change the fact that the 
statute is written evenhandedly to apply equally to both in-staters and out-of-staters. The 
possibility of disproportionate effect upon out-of-staters is adequately considered in the 
Unitary Framework's test for evenhanded-in-application statutes. 
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(1) Where a measure imposes a burden 
mostly, although not exclusively, on out-of-
state interests, the State has the burden of 
justifying that the measure is likely to 
achieve its legitimate purpose; the 
challenger then has the burden of either 
rebutting the State's justification or of 
showing that the purpose can be served as 
well by available nondiscriminatory 
alternatives? 
(2) Where the measure imposes a burden 
exclusively on out-of-state interests, the 
State has the burden of proving that the 
measure is highly likely to achieve its 
legitimate purpose and that the purpose 
cannot be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 
c. If FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY, the measure 
is virtually per se invalid. The State has the heavy 
burden of proving that the measure is virtually 
certain to achieve its legitimate purpose and 
that the purpose cannot be served as well by 
available less discriminatory means.98 
As suggested by the flowchart, the Unitary Framework involves 
two major levels of inquiry: (1) whether the state measure 
pursues a "legitimate state purpose,,99; and, if so, (2) whether this 
legitimate state purpose is so outweighed by the burdens 
imposed by the statute on interstate commerce1OO that the statute 
must be struck down. 
A. The "Legitimate-State-Purpose" Stage 
The first line of inquiry in this Article's Unitary Framework is 
the "legitimate-state-purpose" stage (Step 1), where the Court 
98. See infra notes 128, 139 for discussion of the distinction between the terms 
nondiscriminatory and less discriminatory. 
99. Whether the statute pursues a "legitimate state purpose" depends on whether the 
statute's purpose is to discriminate against out-<>f-state competitors (not legitimate), see 
infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text, or to provide for the health, safety, or welfare 
of the State's citizens (legitimate), see infra notes 102.04 and accompanying text. 
100. As we will see, in conducting this balancing test, the scales on either side of the 
balancing mechanism are more heavily weighted one way or the other depending on 
whether the statute is evenhanded or discriminatory in its application, which in turn 
determines the nature of the burden of proof. See infra notes 14647 and accompanying 
text. 
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asks whether the statute or regulation pursues a legitimate state 
purpose.IOI A legitimate state purpose is one that is 
nondiscriminatory. It may have been enacted, for example, in a 
valid exercise of the State's police power to provide for the 
health, safety, or welfare of its citizens.l02 The Court gives a high 
level of deference to such state legislation; as long as the State 
has articulated a legitimate purpose,103 the statute is presumed to 
be valid, and the inquiry proceeds to the next step.104 
101. See Eule, supra note 14, at 457 ("judicial scrutiny of any legislative act should 
begin with the search for a legitimate end. The Coun must decide whether there is a 
legitimate purpose under the state's police power, or whether the state legislature has 
merely attempted discrimination to achieve commercial advantage for its constituents."). 
102. The Coun has long recognized the idea that States have an inherent "police 
power" that allows them to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. See, 
e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (asserting that "'the States retain authority 
under their general police powers to regulate matters of "legitimate local concern," even 
though interstate commerce may be affected'" (quoting Lewis v. BT Investment 
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980))). The "police power" can be described as "the 
residual prerogatives of sovereignty which the States had not surrendered to the federal 
government." TRIBE, supra note 8, at 405 (citing R. ROETIINGER, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STATE POllCE POWER 10 (1957». As early as 1824, Chief justice Marshall 
referred to "[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic 
trade, and to govern its own citizens." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 208 
(1824); see also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952) (noting that 
"the police power is not confined to a narrow category; it extends ... to all the great 
public needs"); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847) (asserting that the 
police powers of a State "are nothing more or less than the powers of government 
inherent in every sovereignty to the extent ofits dominions"). 
103. SeeEule, supra note 14, at 457 (noting that "the state need not convince the court 
of the veracity of its articulated end. It will, at this point, be taken at its word."). The State 
has the initial "burden of articulating a valid purpose .... This burden, however, is one 
of production, not persuasion." [d. at 457. On the other hand, post.hoc fabrication of 
purpose by the State's counsel is not sufficient to satisfY the state burden of production; 
"little reason exists to defer to a legislative product for which a legitimate state purpose 
derives only from the imagination." [d. at 459. Regarding what would constitute adequate 
articulation of purpose by the State, "[w]here the legislature has set forth its goals in the 
preamble to, or body of, the enactment, the State's burden is easily satisfied." [d. 
Despite justice Scalia's point, in another context, that merely accepting the 
legislature'S articulation of purpose at face value might amount to "a test of whether the 
legislature has a stupid staff," Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1025 n.12 (1992), the Unitary Framework adopts Professor Eule's highly deferential 
posture. Mter all, "no sound justification exists for approaching all proffered purposes as 
though they masked sinister ends." Eule, supra note 14, at 460. This posture is in keeping 
with the underlying premise that the role of regulating the impact of state actions is a 
task better left to Congress than to the judiciary and that the Coun should thus resolve 
hard questions in the States' favor. See, e.g., Nonhwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 
U.S. 292, 302 (1944) (Black, j., concurring) (stating that "[t]he Constitution gives 
[Congress] the power to regulate commerce among the states, and until it acts I think we 
should enter the field with extreme caution"); see also supra notes 35-50 and 
accompanying text. 
104. Under justice Scalia's proposed dormant-commerce-clause formulation, the 
inquiry ends right at this point, once the Court answers the question of whether there 
exists a legitimate state purpose: "When such a validating purpose exists, it is for 
Congress and not us to determine it is not significant enough to justifY the burden on 
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By contrast, in the relatively rare case where the State's 
purpose is shown to be discriminatoryl05-that is, it is designed 
to improve the competitive position of in-state interests at the 
expense of its out-of-state competitors, or to regulate directiy 
out-of-state activity-the statute does not have a legitimate 
purpose. Such a statute so offends fundamental notions of 
economic and political unionl06 that it is said to be, in the words 
of the Unitary Framework, absolutely per se invalid/07 and is 
summarily struck down. 
It is important to make the point that discriminatory purpose is to 
be distinguished from discriminatory effect and from facial 
discrimination. l08 The Court has not clearly stated which of these 
three types of discrimination-facial discrimination; 
discriminatory purpose; or a discriminatory effect-should be 
given the most weight in determining the validity of a state 
statute or, for that matter, how these three types should 
interrelate.I09 Commentators also disagree on which type is the 
commerce." Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 
(1988) (Scalia.J., concurring). 
105. As noted by Professor Eule, "[s]eldom wiII scrutiny of legislative language, 
history, or authoritative state interpretations fail to reveal any permissible state end. Few 
statutes are so inartfully drafted that they boldly reveal an intent to discriminate against 
non-citizens." Eule, supra note 14, at 460; see also Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 
U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (stating that few statutes "artlessly disclose an avowed purpose to 
discriminate against interstate goods"). 
106. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. 
107. In the words of one commentator, "discriminations in purpose are so harmful 
that no state interest, no matter how legitimate and substantial. can ever serve to justifY 
them." Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 
1203, 1245 (1986); see also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 
888,898 (1988) (Scalia,J., concurring) (stating that "a state statute is invalid if, and only 
if. it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not required 
to achieve a lawful state purpose") (emphasis added); Regan, supra note 19, at 1126 
(stating that statutes that are discriminatory in purpose are "antithetical to the very idea 
offederal union"). 
108. Facially discriminatory legislation is legislation that discriminates in its very 
language in favor of in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state interests. 
109. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981) 
(stating that "[a] court may find that a state law constitutes 'economic protectionism' on 
proof either of discriminatory effect or of discriminatory purpose" (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added»; cf., e.g.. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (explaining that 
"once a state law is shown to discriminate against interstate commerce 'either on its face 
or in practical eJJect,' the burden falls on the State to demonstrate ... that the statute 
'serves a legitimate local purpose'" (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 
(1979) (emphasis added»); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 
(1982) (explaining that "[a statute] designed [that is, with a purpose] to gain an 
economic advantage for [local] citizens at the expense of [competing citizens] in 
neighboring states" is "precisely the sort of protectionist regulation that the commerce 
clause declares off-limits to the states"). 
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most harmful and should therefore be given the most weight. 
One commentator argues, "[P] rotectionist effect does not make 
a statute protectionist ... nor does protectionist effect have any 
constitutional significance in itself. The Court both is and 
should be concerned with purpose. Protectionist effect is 
significant evidence on the issue of protectionist purpose; but it 
is just that, evidence and no more."IJO By contrast, another 
commentator argues that the Court "should approach all 
commercial activity 'with an inquiry about the real discrimination 
in effect," which would provide a clearer definition of the 
permissible limits of state discrimination.1II 
Under the Unitary Framework, discriminatory purpose, 
discriminatory effect, and facial discrimination all are 
considered in determining the validity of a state measure that 
affects interstate commerce. These different types of 
discrimination are considered at different stages of the inquiry 
and lead to different evidentiary outcomes. The heaviest weight 
is given to discriminatory purpose, evidence of which renders 
the statute absolutely per se invalid during the "legitimate-state-
purpose" step of the inquiry.1l2 Statutes that are discriminatory in 
purpose are "antithetical to the very idea of federal union,"1IS 
110. Regan, supra note 19, at 1095 (emphasis added). "Protectionist" is Professor 
Regan's term for a discriminato!}, statute that satisfies several characteristics. See id. at 
1094-95. Professor Regan notes that "not just any purpose to advantage local economic 
actors at the expense of [out-of-state] actors is protectionist. The purpose must be to 
advantage local actors at the expense of their [out-of-state] competitors." Regan, supra 
note 19, at 1095; see also Smith, supra note 107, at 1245. 
111. Winkfield F. Twyman,Jr., Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination in Interstale 
Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REv. 381,438 (1995) (emphasis added). 
112. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. 
113. Regan, supra note 19, at 1126. Professor Regan argues that there are three basic 
objections to a state statute that is discriminato!}, in any way. They are: (1) it upsets 
notions of "concept-of-union"; that is, a discriminato!}, state statute "is unacceptable 
because it is inconsistent with the ve!}' idea of political union," id. at 1113; (2) it 
propagates "resentment-retaliation" among the States; that is, discriminato!}, legislation 
"cause[s] resentment and invite[s] protectionist retaliation ... [and] is likely to generate 
a cycle of escalating animosity and isolation ... eventually imperiling the political 
viability of the union itself," id. at 1114; and (3) it is "inefficient"; that is, state 
"protectionism is inefficient because it diverts business away from presumptively low-cost 
producers without any colorable justification in terms of a 'federally cognizable benefit, '" 
id. at 1118. Ail three of these objections are implicated by a statute that is specifically 
discriminato!}, in purpose. First, regarding the "political·union" objection, "the 
unvarnished intention of taking something away from other states just to enjoy it at 
home" is the feature that makes discriminato!}, legislation "antithetical to the ve!}' idea of 
federal union." Id. at 1126. Second, regarding the "resentment-retaliation" objection, 
"protectionist purpose involves a pure preference for local residents on the part of the 
legislating state," which "will certainly inspire resentment in victim states, probably even 
in the unlikely but imaginable case where the protectionist purpose produces no 
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and are summarily struck down under the Unitary Framework's 
first step. As we shall see, the next-heaviest weight is given to 
facial discrimination, evidence of which renders the statute 
virtually per se invalid in the second stage "balancing" step of the 
inquiry.1I4 The Unitary Framework assigns discriminatory effect 
the least weight/15 in the second-stage "balancing" step of the 
inquiry. By considering discriminatory effect in the second-stage 
balancing step, the Unitary Framework tacitly acknowledges that 
discriminatory effect does not rise to the level of discriminatory 
purpose, but that it can still render a statute invalid even absent 
discriminatory purpose or facial discrimination.1I6 
protectionist effect." fd. at 1133. Such resentment can lead to a cycle of retaliation by the 
victim State and further retaliation by the original enacting State, a situation "that poses 
the greatest danger to the nation's political life." fd. at 1137. Third, regarding the 
"inefficiency" objection, "[i]fa law which diverts business from foreign producers to local 
producers is motivated by protectionist purpose, it aims only at transferring welfare from 
"foreigners to their local counterparts ... which is not a federally cognizable benefit." fd. 
at 1130. 
114. See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text. 
115. Statutes that are discriminatory in effect do not have the heavy stage-one 
presumption of absolute per-se invalidity because they are not as onerous as statutes that 
are discriminatory in purpose when measured in the context of the "concept-of-union," 
"resentment-retaliation," and "efficiency" objections discussed above. See supra note 113. 
As ably argued by Professor Regan regarding the "concept-of-union" objection, "[t]here 
is nothing in the idea of federal union that suggests [a state's] laws must be as favorable 
as possible to foreign [competitors] in their overall effect," for a State "cannot be 
forbidden to follow a sensible and innocent policy for its internal regulation just because 
implementing the policy causes some harm in neighboring states." Regan, supra note 19, 
at 1127. From the standpoint of the "resentment-retaliation" objection, statutes that are 
diSCriminatory in effect "seem [ ] less likely to cause resentment [and retaliation] ... than 
protectionist purpose. Protectionist purpose involves a pure preference for local 
residents on the part of the legislating state; protectionist effect arising from a law 
without protectionist purpose does not." fd. at 1133. Finally, from an "efficiency" 
standpoint, just because a statute has some incidental discriminatory effect does not 
mean that it does not pursue certain federally cognizable benefits. See id. at 1129-30. 
One commentator speculates that the Court only in certain circumstances applies a 
presumption of invalidity to statutes that are discriminatory in effect-that is, only when 
the Court has a substantial suspicion that the regulation is also discriminatory in purpose 
but lacks sufficient evidence to characterize it as such. See Smith, supra note 107, at 1249. 
116. Although evidence of discriminatory effect is given less weight in the Unitary 
Framework than evidence of discriminatory purpose or facial discrimination, it still has 
importance aside from simply providing "evidence on the issue of protectionist 
purpose ... and no more." Regan, supra note 19, at 1095. A statute may have an 
altogether legitimate state purpose, yet have discriminatory effects so onerous that the 
Court would feel compelled to strike it down. Consider, for example, Hunt v. 
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), where in an avowed 
effort to eliminate the dangers of deception and confusion in the marketplace caused by 
the multiplicity of apple grading systems among various States, the North Carolina 
legislature enacted a statute requiring that all closed containers of apples sold or shipped 
into the State bear "no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard." Hunt, 
432 U.S. at 335 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-189.1 (1973». The effect of the statute 
was to prohibit the sale of apples that displayed a grade other than the applicable U.S. 
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B. The "Balancing" Step 
Once a statute "passes" the first-stage "legitimate-state-
purpose" step, the inquiry proceeds to the "balancing" step.117 
This step involves a consideration of the burdening effectllB of the 
statute on interstate commerce and of the statute's benefits to 
the State. In conducting this inquiry, it is necessary first to 
"calibrate" the scales to account for whether the statute is 
evenhanded or discriminatoryll9 in its application. 12o The challenger 
has the initial burden of showing that the statute is 
discriminatory. 
grade (including apples from Washington State, which were required by Washington 
state law to provide more information than that required by U.S. law). 
Finding that it was not necessary to find facial discrimination or discriminatory 
purpose-evidence of discriminatory ejJect was enough-the Court struck down the 
statute: 
[W]e need not ascribe an economic protection motive to the North Carolina 
Legislature to resolve this case; we conclude that the challenged statute cannot 
stand insofar as it prohibits the display of Washington State grades even if 
enacted for the declared purpose of protecting consumers from deception and 
fraud in the marketplace. 
Id. at 352-53. Had the Court been inclined to conduct a more thorough examination of 
intent, it may well have found evidence of economic motive since North Carolina had no 
system of grading apples. In light of this fact, the State's avowed purpose of protecting its 
citizens from the dangers of more stringent labeling requirements rings more than a 
little hollow. 
Under the Regan approach, the discriminatory effect of this statute could only be 
considered as evidence of discriminatory purpose and would not be struck down if such 
purpose could not be found. Regardless of whether one believes the Court should be 
involved in regulating interstate commerce rather than leaving such matters to Congress, 
the plain fact is that the Court does get involved. Any workable analytical framework must 
be able to accommodate the Court as it is, not only as we wish it were. By retaining the 
currency of discriminatory effect in the analytical mix, the Unitary Framework 
accommodates the Court's existing jurisprudence while leaving ample room for the 
Court to refrain from deciding such issues should it so desire. 
117. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Unitary 
Framework's.use of the term "balancing" during this stage. 
118. If the statute had been found to have had a discriminatory purpose, it would have 
been found invalid under the first step of this Article's Unitary Framework, and the 
inquiry would have ended at that point. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra note 97. 
120. This calibration is performed in order to determine the proper level of deference 
to be given the statute and, correspondingly, where the burden of proof shall lie-with 
the State or with the challenger. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text. Professor 
Eule developed a useful system for measuring the level of a state statute's 
disproportionate effect (if any) on out-of-state interests, which he called "Outsider 
Impact Percentage" (OIP). A statute "whose effects fall exclusively on nonrepresented 
[that is, out-of-state] interests, for example, would have an OIP of 100%. A legislative 
enactment that cast its weight equally upon those within and without the State [that is, 
an "evenhanded" measure] would have an OIP of 50%," Eule, supra note 14, at 460-61. A 
measure whose burdens fall mostly, but not exclusively, on out-of-state interests would 
have an OIP of between 50 percent and 100 percent, and a measure which primarily 
burdens in-state interests would have an OIP ofless than 50 percent. See id. 
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Evenhandei21 measures, because "[t]here is little reason to 
doubt the motives underlying a legislative measure that falls 
solely, predominately, or equally on interests actually 
represented in the regulating body,,,I22 and because there is no 
disproportionate impact on out-of-state interests, will be given a 
strong presumption of validity. Under the Unitary Framework, 
the challenger will have the burden of proving that the damage 
caused by the measure to interstate commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the benefits gained by the State.l23 If the 
challenger fails to meet this burden, the measure will be upheld 
as falling within the State's prerogative to regulate matters 
• •• 124 Impactmg mterstate commerce. 
By contrast, if the statute is discriminatory in its application,l25 
under the Unitary Framework, the Court will apply a 
presumption of invalidity. The strength of this presumption 
depends upon the magnitude of the measure's 
"disproportionality." Where the burden of the measure falls 
121. For the sake of clarity in developing the Unitary Framework, the "evenhanded" 
line ofinquirywiII be referred to as "Step 2(a)." 
122. Eule, supra note 14, at 461. 
123. For development of this standard, see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970); see also, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
441 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). For an example of the rare case where the challenger meets its 
burden of demonstrating that the damaging impact on interstate commerce of an 
evenhanded stamte clearly exceeds the benefits to the State, see Bibb v. Navajo Freight 
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (striking down an llIinois stamte requiring that all 
trucks, regardless of origin, be equipped with contoured mudflaps); see also infra notes 
172-80 and accompanying text. 
124. As argued by Professor Eule, "[t]his deferential stance is mandated by prudential 
concerns. Our system of government counsels against second-guessing the legislative 
resolutions of these questions. The judiciary, in this instance, should not demand more 
than a legitimate, articulated end and the selection of a means rationally designed to 
achieve such a goal." Eule, supra note 14, at 469 (foomote omitted). Further, 
[w] hen legislation is evenhanded in its effects, it is not for the courts to 
scrutinize whether the state has adopted the least burdensome stamtory 
scheme. In such instances the "Wisdom" of the legislamre, its "identity with 
the people, and the influence which [its] constiments possess at elections" 
ought be enough to prevent abuse. A state legislamre is unlikely to burden 
its own citizenry beyond the degree needed to achieve the desired benefit. 
Id. at 473 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 197 (1824»; see also, e.g., 
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding local ordinance prohibiting 
door-to-door sales by any solicitor, regardless of origin). 
125. The "discriminatory-in-application" line of inquiry will be referred to in the 
Unitary Framework as "Step 2(b)." Step 2(b) (1) involves discriminatory stamtes whose 
burden affects out-of-state interests disproportionally, but not exclusively, see infra notes 
126-29 and accompanying text; Step 2(b)(2) involves discriminatory stamtes whose 
burden affects out-of-state interests exclusively, see infra notes 130-34 and accompanying 
text. 
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mostly, although not exclusively, on foreign interests,126 under 
the Unitary Framework, the State must justify the measure with 
an explanation of "the extent to which its selected means are 
likely to achieve the legitimate end it has articulated. ,,127 If the 
State is able to meet this burden, the burden shifts back to the 
challenger either to rebut the State's justification or to 
demonstrate that the purpose can be sexved as well by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.128 If either can be done, the 
statute will be struck down.l29 
126. Such a measure would have an OIP of between 50 percent and 100 percent 
under Professor Eule's formulation. See supra note 120. 
127. Eule, supra note 14, at 472. The burden placed on the State to justify its measure 
increases incrementally as the OIP ranges upward from 51 percent to 99 percent. That is, 
as the OIP increases, the State is required to demonstrate a correspondingly increased 
likelihood that the measure will in fact achieve the desired legitimate end. See id. "At the 
lower levels of disproportionality the state's burden will be easily carried. At the upper 
reaches, proofwill not come without some difficulty." [d. (footnotes omitted). 
In one of the first articles to advance the idea of imposing a form of "graduated 
burden of proof' on States depending on the nature of the discriminatory effect, 
Professor Tushnet suggested that cases involving measures whose burdens would fall 
exclusively on out-of-state ("foreign") interests "would call for skepticism about asserted 
nondiscriminatory goals." Tushnet, supra note 17, at 141. By contrast, cases involving 
measures whose burdens fall both on foreign and local interests, but whose benefits 
inure solely to local interests "would use a somewhat more generous approach." [d. Cases 
involving measures whose burdens fall disproportionately on foreign interests and whose 
benefits are disproportionately local "would call for a test requiring something like a 'fair 
and substantial' relation between the state's nondiscriminatory purpose and the 
regulation adopted." [d. Cases involving measures that burden and benefit both local and 
foreign interests "would use a simple rationality test." [d. 
The requirement that the State proffer a legitimate reason for the specific measure 
should be distinguished from the step-one requirement of demonstrating a legitimate 
purpose. The former addresses the means used; the latter addresses the end. 
128. The Unitary Framework requires the challenger to demonstrate that no 
reasonable, "nondiscriminatory" alternatives are available, whereas the Court and 
commentators have spoken at times in terms of" less discriminatory" alternatives. See, e.g., 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 143 (1986) (upholding a lower-court decision 
"conclud[ing] that less discriminatory means of protecting against these threats were 
currently unavailable") (emphasis added); Eule, supra note 14, at 473 (stating that 
"[w]hen the effect of the statute is exclusively on out-of-state interests, the state must 
convince the court that no less disproportional scheme would have worked as well") 
(emphasis added). 
There is much precedent for the "nondiscriminatory" language, as well-indeed, the 
Court usually has spoken in terms of requiring the State to show no available reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives. See infra note 133. With the exception of one type of state 
measure, see infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text, the Unitary Framework adopts 
the more consistent "nondiscriminatory" language, in keeping with this Article's 
underlying theme of encouraging the Court to leave the responsibility for answering 
close questions concerning the regulation of interstate commerce to Congress, where it 
properly belongs. See supra notes 35-50. By applying the more lenient 
"nondiscriminatory" standard, the Court will be more likely to uphold a statute that is 
marginally discriminatory (that is, a statute that has an OIP of between 51 percent and 99 
percent). See supra note 120. It is certainly within the power of Congress to legislate on 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 425 1997-1998
No.2] Toward a More CoherentDonnant Commerce Clause 425 
Where, however, the burden of the measure falls exclusively on 
out-ofstate ("foreign") interests/so the State has a greater 
burden. In such a case, the measure would be struck down 
unless the State meets its burden of proving that the measure is 
highly likelyl31 to achieve its legitimate purpose and that the 
purpose cannot be served as well by available 
d· .. 132 al . 133 N th th b d non Iscnmmatory ternaUves. ote at e ur en stays 
with the State and does not shift back to the challenger in this 
the particular matter if it so desires, but the Court should not assume this legislative 
function. 
129. This shift of burden from the State to the challenger in cases where the burden 
of the state measure falls disproportionally, although not exclusively, on foreign interests 
was first proposed by Professor Eule. See Eule, supra note 14, at 473-74. To date, the Court 
has not applied this technique. 
130. Such a measure would have an OIP of 100 percent under Professor Eule's 
formulation. See supra note 120. 
131. This follows from the State's burden to demonstrate increased likelihood that the 
measure will in fact achieve the desired legitimate end as the OIP increases from 51 
percent to 99 percent. See supra note 120. The State's burden to demonstrate the likely 
success of the measure in achieving the desired purpose would be correspondingly 
higher when the OIP reaches 100 percent (hence the requirement that success be 
"highly" likely). "At the upper reaches [of disproportionality], proof will not come 
without some difficulty." Eule, supra note 14, at 472. 
132. For the reason explained above, see supra note 128, the Unitary Framework 
adopts the "nondiscriminatory" language for the burden placed on the challenger in this 
step. 
133. See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (explaining that u a 
State may validate a statute that discriminates against interstate commerce by showing 
that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives"); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) 
(explaining that once a state law is shown to discriminate, the burden falls on the State 
to demonstrate both that the statute "serve[s] a legitimate local purpose, and that [the] 
purpose ... could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means") (quoting 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (internal quotations omitted»; Hughes 
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (noting that "'when discrimination against 
commerce .•• is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of 
the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory 
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake'" (quoting Hunt v. 
Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977»); Dean Milk Co. v. 
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (reasoning that a State cannot discriminate "if 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local 
interests, are available"); see also Eule, supra note 14, at 473. Professor Eule suggests that 
ld. 
[w]hen a showing of disproportionality has been made by the statute's 
challenger, ... inquiry into the existence of less disproportional schemes is 
warranted .... When the effect of the statute is exclusively on out-of-state 
interests, the state must convince the court that no less disproportional scheme 
would have worked as well. 
Professor Eule also proposes that the State "will be unable to satisfy this burden in the 
absence of proof 'that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the 
statute is aimed.'" ld. (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948». 
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case. As it has been applied by the Court, this standard has 
proved to be a high bar indeed for the States. 1M 
The Unitary Framework retains a heightened "virtually per se 
invalid" standard for one class of discriminatory statute. If the 
statute discriminates on its face,ls5 in the unlikely event it has 
survived Step 1 and has been shown to have a legitimate 
purpose,IS6 it is considered to be virtually per se invalid.ls7 At this 
point, the State may overcome the heavy presumption of 
invalidity only upon a showing that the measure is virtually 
134. In the words of one commentator, "the strict scrutiny applied to 'discriminatory' 
statutes usually has proved fatal .... Only a few statutes have survived this test." Farber & 
Hudec, supra note 23, at 1415. Indeed, the Court on occasion has stated that the scrutiny 
of such a statute rises to a level where the statute is considered to be "virtually per se 
invalid." See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (stating that 
"where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per·se rule 
of invalidity has been erected") (citing, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 
525, 537-38 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-{)6 (1948); Baldwin v. G.A.F. 
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935». 
Although the Unitary Framework will accommodate a heavy strict-scrutiny, virtually per-
se invalid presumption for exclusively discriminatory-in-application statutes if the Court 
so chooses, the Unitary Framework is also designed to allow the Court to develop a 
practice of allowing States greater opportunity to meet their burden in such cases. In 
particular, with one exception, see infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text, the Unitary 
Framework does not raise the negative presumption for discriminatory-in-application 
statutes to a virtually-per-se invalid level. Rather, the statute is presumed to be invalid, but 
that presumption can be rebutted if a State adequately meets its burden of proof. The 
latter approach of lessening the State's burden is preferred as in keeping with this 
Article's underlying theme of encouraging less judicial intervention in an area where the 
Constitution has given Congress explicit authority to act but where Congress has not in 
fact acted. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text. The Framework, however, is 
flexible enough to accommodate whichever approach the Court should decide to take. 
135. The facial-discrimination line of inquiry will be referred to in the Unitary 
Framework as "Step 2(c)." 
136. In actuality, due to the very high correlation between facial discrimination and 
discriminatory purpose, a facially discriminatory statute usually will be found to have a 
discriminatory purpose and will be summarily struck down in the Unitary Framework's 
stage-one legitimate-state-purpose step without ever reaching the stage-two balancing 
step. Facial discrimination is highly probative evidence of discriminatory purpose. 
137. In support of the per se rule [instead of a more lenient rule] there is not 
merely the statistical point that explicitness in a law will reflect bad [that is, 
discriminatory] purpose much more often than not; there is the equally 
important point that the existence of the per se rule will stop many explicit laws 
with bad purpose from being passed. 
Regan, supra note 19, at 1134. A facially discriminatory measure is not absolutely per·se 
invalid (as is a statute with a discriminatory purpose, see supra note 107 and accompanying 
text) because it is at least remotely possible that a facially discriminatory statute may have 
a nondiscriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (requiring 
inspections of out-of-state cows in an effort to contain Bang's Disease). As we have seen, 
the Unitary Framework regards discriminatory purpose as the touchstone for a statute's 
invalidity under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See supra notes 105-07, 112, and 
accompanying text. 
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certain to achieve the legitimate purposel38 and that the purpose 
could not be served as well by available lesS139 discriminatory 
means.
140 Under this Step 2(c) of the Unitary Framework analysis 
for facially discriminatory measures, if the State fails to make the 
requisite showing, the facially discriminatory measure will be 
struck down. 
A couple of points of explanation and clarification are in 
order regarding "balancing." A number of Supreme Court 
Justices and legal commentators have argued that the process of 
balancing is too uncertain in its application and is thus not 
appropriate in the dormant-commerce-clause context, despite its 
resilience and widespread use. Justice Scalia, for one, has 
advocated "abandon [ing] the 'balancing' approach to these 
negative commerce clause cases ... and leav[ing] essentially 
legislative judgments to the Congress.,,141 One commentator 
138. This requirement is the natural extension of the requirement, set out in Steps 
2(b)(1) and 2(b)(2), that the State show an increasing likelihood of the success of the 
measure as the disproportionality increases. See supra notes 127, 131. The State's burden 
to demonstrate the likely success of the measure in achieving the desired purpose would 
be at its highest with facially discriminatory statutes. 
139. The importance of the "less-discriminatory" language here is that the State will be 
less likely to be able to overcome the presumption of invalidity. The State would have to 
show not only that the legitimate purpose could not be served as well by an available 
nondiscriminatory (that is, evenhanded) measure, but also that it could not be served as 
well by other less discriminatory statutes. In short, the universe of measures the- State 
would be required to rebut is considerably larger when the "less" discriminatory language 
is used. See supra note 128 for additional discussion of the distinction between the 
"nondiscriminatory" and "less-discriminatory" language. 
The Unitary Framework applies the less-discriminatory standard in the case of facially 
discriminatory measures on the reasoning that facial discrimination comes very close to 
offending basic economic and political notions of national unity that the Commerce 
Clause was designed to promote. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text; see also 
supra notes 136-37 (explaining the notion that facially discriminatory statutes usually 
reflect discriminatory purpose and that the stricter "less-discriminatory" requirement 
"will stop many explicit laws with bad purpose from being passed"). 
140. This approach is consistent with the Coun's actual treatment of facially 
discriminatory statutes. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (holding that 
"once a state law is shown to discriminate against interstate commerce 'either on its face 
or in practical effect,' the burden falls on the State to demonstrate both that the statute 
'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and that this purpose could not be served as well by 
available nondiscriminatory means" (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 
(1979»); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979) (holding that "facial 
discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose .... At a 
minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny"). 
141. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) 
(Scalia, j., concurring) (stating also that balancing the burden to interstate commerce 
against the State's interest in negative-commerce-clause cases is somewhat akin to 
"judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy"); see also CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, j., concurring) 
(stating that "[balancing] is ill suited to the judicial function and should be undenaken 
rarely if at all"). 
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argues that the "Court's use of the ad hoc balancing test in 
commerce clause cases has failed to generate the kind of 
consistent, principled decisionmaking that is essential to the 
orderly development of constitutional law.,,142 Another asserts 
that the Court's "modern balancing approach has fallen short of 
its early promise to instill order in dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence .... [and] fails to provide state lawmakers with a 
clear guide to the difference between permissible and 
impermissible regulation. ,,145 
Indeed, some commentators and several Justices have argued 
that what the Court is doing is not really "balancing" at all. 
Three dissentingJustices recently asserted that, 
[a]lthough this analysis of competing interests has sometimes 
been called a "balancing test," it is not so much an open-
ended weighing of an ordinance's pros and cons, as an 
assessment of whether an ordinance discriminates in practice 
or otherwise unjustifiably operates to isolate a State's 
economy from the national common market. l44 
Professor Regan argues in his influential article that, 
[f]or almost fifty years, scholars have urged the Court to 
"balance" in dormant commerce clause cases; and the 
scholars have imagined that the Court was following their 
advice. The Court has indeed claimed to balance, winning 
scholarly approval. But the Court knows better than the 
scholars. Despite what the Court has said, it has not been 
balancing .... [Rather, the Court] has been concerned 
exclusively with preventing states from engaging in 
ful . .. 14S purpose economIC protectIonIsm. 
142. Maltz, supra note 16, at 89. 
143. Twyman, supra note 111, at 393-94. 
144. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423 (1994) (Souter, J., 
dissenting): see also infra notes 224-35 and accompanying text. 
145. Regan, supra note 19, at 1092.Justice Scalia has cited Professor Regan's article on 
this point, noting that 
[o]ne commentator has suggested that, at least much of the time, we do not in 
fact mean what we say when we declare that ... [we are using] a "balancing" 
test.lfhe is not correct, he ought to be. As long as a State's •.. law ... does not 
discriminate against out-of-state interests, it should suIVive this Court's scrutiny 
under the Commerce Clause ...• Beyond that, it is for Congress to prescribe its 
validity. 
CIS Corp., 481 U.S. at 95-96 (Scalia,]., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
Professor Regan limits his assertion to so-called "movement of goods" cases, as 
opposed to transportation cases and taxation cases (in which he concedes the Court 
"engage[s] in a very particular balancing task"). Regan, supra note 19, at 1093. 
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Clearly, any "balancing" the Court has done has been 
accomplished with a very heavy thumb on the scales and cannot 
accurately be characterized as an "open-ended balancing" 
process. The outcome of the Court's inquiry is highly correlated 
with where lies the presumption (and burden-of-proof), which 
in tum depends upon whether the Court considers the statute 
evenhanded or discriminatory in application. 146 Mter an 
objective determination of whether a statute is evenhanded or 
discriminatory in application, the resultant heavy presumption 
and placement of burden of proof on either the State or the 
challenger heavily influences the ultimate disposition of the 
case. 
Despite all of this, the Unitary Framework retains the 
"balancing" moniker for what occurs when the Court passes on 
the validity of a state statute that in some way regulates interstate 
commerce. Even if we accept the proposition that the Court's 
primary objective in deciding dormant-commerce-clause cases is 
to prevent States from engaging in protectionist behavior, this 
does not negate the reality that the Court often considers 
competing state and national interests in relative terms, which 
qualifies as a form of "balancing" under most definitions, even if 
one side of the scale is heavily favored. Until a majority of the 
Court itself decides to change its terminology for what it does 
when it analyzes competing national and local interests, the 
Unitary Framework will refer to the process as "balancing.,,147 
C. The Unitary Framework Applied to Existing 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate how the Unitary Framework 
simplifies dormant-commerce-clause analysis is to classify the 
existing dormant-commerce-clause cases by subject matter148 and 
146. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text. 
147. In practice, because the outcome of the Unitary Framework's stage-two dormant-
commerce-clause inquiry is so dependent on whether the Court considers the statute 
evenhanded or discriminatory in its application, what we decide to call the stage-two 
inquiry is largely irrelevant; the Framework will operate regardless of what stage two is 
labeled. This is in keeping with the premise that the Unitary Framework does not 
propose reform, so much as it is intended to expose the hidden order reflected in the 
Supreme Court's current approach to dormant-commerce-clause questions. See supra 
note 22 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra note 89-92 and accompanying text. 
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then to explain how the cases would be viewed under the 
U · F k 149 mtary ramewor . 
1. State Regulations Involving Transportation 
. A number of Supreme Court dormant-commerce-clause cases 
in the last seventy-five years have involved state transportation 
regulations or, more precisely, regulations restricting access to 
transportation facilities by out-of-state users. A threshold 
question in these cases has been the State's intent in enacting the 
regulation because the Supreme Court has long accepted the 
proposition that States may regulate their transportation 
facilities as long as the legislative intent was to protect public 
safety. 150 If the statute was enacted to protect the health and 
safety of its citizens, it would be given a high measure of 
deference; 151 but if the statute was enacted primarily to protect 
in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-state 
interests, the Court would view it much more critically.152 
In the early case of South Carolina State Highway Department v. 
Barnwell Brothers,153 Justice Stone explained the Court's approach 
when reviewing state safety regulationsl54 involving highways and 
motor vehicles: "[T]he judicial function, under the commerce 
clause ... stops with the inquiry [of] whether the state 
legislature in adopting regulations ... has acted within its 
province, and whether the means of regulation chosen are 
reasonably adapted to the end sought .... ,,155 In answering the 
first part of the inquiry-whether the state legislature acted 
149. This discussion concentrates within the modem era (approximately 1930s to 
present) on the more recent Supreme Court dormant-commerce-clause cases and a 
number of the older landmark cases. In so doing, the discussion focuses on the Court's 
existingdormant-commerce-clausejurisprudence. 
150. See, e.g., Bradleyv. Public Utils. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) (finding acceptable 
an Ohio statute requiring licensure of truckers on the grounds that the statute was 
intended to promote safety); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) (finding acceptable 
an Alabama law requiring that locomotive engineers be licensed on the grounds that it 
was intended to promote safety). 
151. In essence, in such circumstances, the Court is deferring to the State's police 
power-that is, the State's sovereign right to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizens. See supra note 102. 
152. See, e.g., Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (holding unconstitutional a 
Washington statute requiring certification of all common carriers because the underlying 
motivation for the statute was protectionist); see generally, TRIBE, supra note 8, at 437. 
153. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
154. The statute at issue set maximum weight and width requirements for trucks 
operated on South Carolina highways. See id. at 181 n.l. 
155. Id. at 190. 
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within its authority-the Court noted that it had repeatedly 
affirmed the principle that a State "'may rightly prescribe 
uniform regulations adapted to promote safety upon its 
highways and the conservation of their use, applicable alike to 
vehicles moving in interstate commerce and those of its own 
citizens.",156 In answering the second part of the inquiry-
whether the means were reasonably related to the end-the 
Court noted that 
courts do not sit as legislatures, either state or national .... 
When the action of a legislature is within the scope of its 
power, fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, 
wisdom, and propriety are not for the determination of 
courts, but for the legislative body, on which rests the duty 
and responsibility of decision .... It is not any the less a 
legislative power committed to the states because it affects 
interstate commerce, and courts are not any the more 
entitled, because interstate commerce is affected, to 
substitute their own for the legislative judgment .... 157 
In other words, under the formulation set out in Barnwell, as 
long as the State acts within its established police power right to 
regulate motor vehicles for safety purposes,158 the Court will give 
a high level of deference to the regulation, overturning it only if 
the regulation is not plausibly "reasonably related" to the safety 
goal. 
When viewed through this Article's proposed Unitary 
Framework, the statute in Barnwell passes the stage-one 
legitimate-state-purpose test because the statute's purpose is to 
regulate highway safety, and as such is worthy of a high degree 
of deference at this stage.159 The analysis thus proceeds to the 
stage-two balancing step, where the statute is analyzed within the 
156. ld. at 189 (quoting Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143 (1927), and citing Sproles v. 
Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 389, 390 (1932); Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163,169 (1928); 
Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557 (1927». 
157. ld. at 190-91 (internal citations omitted). 
158. The Court suggested that "[f]ew subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly of 
local concern as is the use of state highways." ld. at 187. In this regard, the Court's 
deference to state regulation of highways is greater than that given state regulation of 
railroads, a distinction explained in Barnwell "Unlike the railroads, local highways are 
built, owned, and maintained by the state or its municipal subdivisions. The state has a 
primary and immediate concern in their safe and economical administration." ld. By 
contrast, railroads are mostly privately built. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 
761, 783 (1945) (distinguishing Barnacle on the grounds that the State had constructed 
the highways in that case and thus had "far more extensive control [over the highways] 
than over interstate railroads"). 
159. See supra notes 102'()4 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 432 1997-1998
432 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 21 
Unitary Framework's "evenhanded-in-application" step (Step 
2(a» because it regulates maximum weight and width 
requirements for all trucks, whether from out-of-state or inside 
the State.l60 The statute is presumed to be valid and is upheld 
unless its challenger can demonstrate that the burden on 
interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the state 
benefits.161 Although the statute undeniably affects interstate 
commerce/62 because the State's interest is so significant/63 the 
challenger is not able to meet its burden of demonstrating a 
"clearly excessive" burden on interstate commerce, and the 
statute is upheld under the Unitary Framework. 
In Southern Pacific v. Arizona,l64 by contrast, the Court struck 
down a state statute that prohibited trains of more than fourteen 
passenger or seventy freight cars from operating within the 
State, reasoning that the "'convenient apologetics of the police 
power'" would not allow a State to regulate interstate commerce 
"so substantially as to affect its flow or deprive it of needed 
uniformity in its regulation .... ,,165 In arriving at its decision, the 
160. The Court noted the existence of an "inner political check": that is, the fact that 
the statute "affects alike shippers in interstate and intrastate commerce in large numbers 
within as well as without the state is a safeguard against their abuse." Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 
187; see also supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
It can be argued that, after some period of time, South Carolina trucks almost certainly 
will be affected by the statute to a lesser degree than out-of-state trucks, due to the fact 
that in-state trucks will have had time to adjust to the State's limits, thereby making this 
statute not evenhanded. The fact that the effect may not be evenhanded does not change 
the fact that the statute is evenhandedly applied to both in-staters and out-of·staters. See 
supra note 97. As noted by the Court in a later case, "[a] nondiscriminatory [that is, 
evenhanded] regulation ... is not invalid simply because it causes some business to shift 
from a predominantly out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state industry. Only if 
the burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State's legitimate purposes 
does such a regulation violate the Commerce Clause." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1981). The "clearly excessive" language of the Unitary 
Framework's evenhanded-in-application step closely tracks the Court's "clearly 
outweighs" language in Clover Leaf. 
161. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142 (1970); see also, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). 
162. The Court noted that state regulations concerning the use of state highways are 
"inseparable from [having] a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Barnwell, 303 
U.S. at 187. The Court explained, however, that it has upheld many sorts of state 
regulations materially affecting interstate commerce. See id. at 188 n.5. 
163. "Few subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly of local concern as is the use of 
state highways •.•. The state has a primary and immediate concern in their safe and 
economical administration." Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 187. 
164. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
165. [d. at 779-80 (quoting Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 15 (1925); Kansas City S. 
Ry. Co. v. KawValley Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914». Ninety-three to ninety-five percent of 
the Arizona rail traffic affected by the statute was interstate rail traffic. See Southern Pac. 
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Court averred that a state safety statute should be upheld unless 
its total effect as a safety measure is so slight that it does not 
outweigh the national interest in protecting unimpeded 
interstate commerce.l66 On the facts of the case, the Court 
determined that the statute's burden on interstate commerce 
outweighed the State's safety considerations in limiting train-
length. 167 The Court thus, for the first time, in Southern Pacific 
explicitly balanced the State's interest in maintaining a 
regulation against the burden that the regulation would work on 
interstate commerce.l68 
Under the Unitary Framework, Southern Pacific is overturned 
in the stage-two evenhanded balancing step (Step 2(a»:69 The 
Arizona statute's safety purpose is legitimate,17O and the analysis 
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. at 771. The Court distinguished Barnwell by observing that the 
matter at issue in that case involved the regulation of highways and noted that 
[u]nlike the railroads local highways are built, owned and maintained by the 
state or its municipal subdivisions. The state is responsible for their safe and 
economical administration. Regulations affecting the safety of their use must be 
applied alike to intrastate and interstate traffic. The fact that they affect alike 
shippers in interstate and intrastate commerce in great numbers, within as weIl 
as without the state, is a safeguard against regulatory abuses. 
Id.at 783. 
166. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 775-76. 
167. Here we conclude that the state does go too far. Its regulation of train 
lengths, admittedly obstructive to interstate train operation, and having a 
seriously adverse effect on transportation efficiency and economy, passes 
beyond what is plainly essential for safety since it does not appear that it wiIl 
lessen rather than increase the danger of accident .... The state interest 
cannot be preserved at the expense of the national interest ... . 
Id. at 781-82. 
168. The justices were not unanimous in their agreement that the Court should use 
this new balancing test. Specifically, the dissents argued that by getting involved in 
balancing equities, the Court was improperly taking on the role of a "super-legislature," 
id. at 788 (Black,j., dissenting), and that the matter of determining train-length safety 
was more appropriately left to the political process than to the judicial process, see id. at 
795 (Douglas, j., dissenting). justice Douglas suggested that it was improper for the 
Court to get involved in balancing in light of the fact that 
Congress has given the Interstate Commerce Commission broad powers of 
regulation over interstate carriers. The Commission is the national agency 
which has been entrusted with the task of promoting a safe, adequate, efficient, 
and economical transportation service. It is the expert on this subject. It is in a 
position to police the field. And if its powers prove inadequate for the task, 
Congress, which is the paranlOunt authority in this field, can implement them. 
Id. (Douglas,]., dissenting). 
169. The statute was evenhanded in its application because it prohibited all trains of 
more than fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars from operating within the State, 
regardless of origin. 
170. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 770 (stating that "the matters for ultimate 
determination here are the nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation 
of interstate trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce ... " 
(emphasis added) ). 
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proceeds to the stage-two balancing step. Because the statute 
imposes its burdens evenhandedly against both in-state and out-
of:.state railroads, the statute carries, under the Unitary 
Framework, a strong presumption of validity, and the challenger 
carries a heavy burden of proving that the burden on interstate 
commerce is clearly excessive vis-a-vis the benefits to the State. 
In this case, the challenger in fact meets its burden by clearly 
demonstrating that the statute is "obstructive to interstate train 
operation, and ha[s] a seriously adverse effect on transportation 
efficiency and economy," while not improving train safety.171 
Accordingly, the statute is struck down. 
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., I 72 the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the principle established in Barnwell that 
individual state legislatures should be given great deference in 
matters involving highway safety.173 Nonetheless, the Court held 
an Illinois highway safety statutel74 unconstitutional on the 
evidence of a "massive showing of burden on interstate 
commerce,,175 as balanced against the State's relatively 
inconclusive showing that the statute resulted in greater safety 
. h' h 176 on Its Ig ways. 
The purpose of the statute in Bibb, providing for highway 
safety, was clearly legitimate,177 and the analysis under the 
Unitary Framework proceeds to the stage-two evenhanded 
171. ld. at 781; see also supra note 167. 
172. 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
173. The Coun noted that 
[t]hese safety measures cany a strong presumption of validity when challenged 
in court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to 
determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective. Policy 
decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field. Unless 
we can conclude on the whole record that "the total effect of the law as a safety 
measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not 
to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from 
interferences which seriously impede it," we must uphold the statute. 
ld. at 524 (quoting SouthemPaci.fic, 325 U.S. at 775-76) (internal citations omitted). 
174. The TIlinois statute required that all trucks be equipped with contoured 
mudflaps, thus making illegal in Illinois the use of straight mudflaps that were legal in 
forty-five States and actually required in one State. See id. at 523. 
175. ld. at 528. Among the burdens created by the statute are the significant delays 
caused by the necessity of changing mudflaps when traveling between Arkansas (which 
requires straight mudflaps) and Illinois; the danger involved in changing the mudflaps 
on trucks carrying explosive loads; and the serious interference with "interline" 
operations, which would particularly affect the shipment of perishables. See id. at 527-28. 
176. See id. at 530. 
177. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 435 1997-1998
No.2] Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause 435 
balancing step (Step 2(a)).l7B Because the challenger in Bibb is 
able to demonstrate that the burden of the statute on interstate 
commerce is clearly excessive when compared to its benefits to 
the State,I79 the statute is struck down under Step 2(a). Like 
Southern Pacific, Bibb "is one of those cases-few in number--
where local safety measures that are nondiscriminatory [that is, 
evenhanded-in-application] place an unconstitutional burden 
on interstate commerce."I80 
The Court's traditionally high level of deference for state 
highway safety regulationsl81 was further eroded in more recent 
transportation cases. In Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. 
Rice,182 the Court held unconstitutional Wisconsin safety 
regulations limiting truck length to fifty-five feet. l83 The Court 
found unconvincing Wisconsin's argument that the proper test 
for highway safety statutes was the "rational relation" test set out 
earlier in Bamwel~184 opting instead to balance the State's 
interest against the burden to interstate commerce according to 
the test set out in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. lss In conducting its 
balancing, the Court noted that Wisconsin, in response to the 
"massive array of evidence to disprove the State's assertion that 
the regulations make some contribution to highway 
safety ... virtually defaulted in its defense of the regulations as a 
safety measure.... [In addition,] the regulations impose a 
substantial burden on the interstate movement of goods.,,186 
178. The statute is evenhanded because it requires the mudflap on all trucks, 
regardless of whether they originate from in-5tate or out-of-5tate. See Bibb, 359 U.S: at 529. 
179. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
180. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529. 
181. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
182. 434 U.S. 429 (1978). 
183. See ill. at 447-48. 
184. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. 
185. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that "[w]here the statute regulates 
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits"); see also infra note 
219 and accompanying text. 
186. Ro.y17W1ld, 434 U.S. at 444, 447. An important consideration in the Court's 
balancing was the fact that WISconsin had given numerous exceptions to in-5tate 
manufacturers and industries, casting further doubt on the State's safety claim and 
·undermin[ing] the assumption that the State's own political processes will act as a check 
on local regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce." [d. at 446-47. In other 
words, the beneficiaries of the exemptions, who might othenYise be able to change the 
adverse effects of the law through the political process, would now have no incentive to 
do so because they are exempt from the law. See supra notes 8485 for discussion of the 
"inner political check." 
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Reasoning that the regulations "place a substantial burden on 
interstate commerce and ... cannot be said to make more than 
the most speculative contribution to highway safety," the Court 
struck down the statute.187 
Under the Unitary Framework, the state highway-safety 
measures in Raymond are presumed to further a "legitimate state 
purpose,"I88 and the analysis proceeds to the stage-two balancing 
step of the inquiry. Because the regulations impose their 
burdens in a discriminatory fashion mostly, but not exclusively, 
against out-of-state interests,189 they are analyzed under the 
Unitary Framework's stage-two discriminatory-in-application 
(non-exclusive) step (Step 2(b)(1».I90 As such, the regulations 
are presumed to be invalid, and the State has the burden of 
proving that the regulations are likely to lead to the achievement 
of the legitimate goal. If the State is able to meet its burden, the 
187. Rayrrwnd, 434 U.S. at 447. Although the Court was unanimous in its conclusion 
that the Wisconsin statute was unconstitutional, four concurring Justices were hesitant to 
characterize the means by which the Court reached its decision as a "balancing" of 
interests; rather, the concurring Justices argued that here "the Court does not engage in 
a balance of policies; it does not make a legislative choice. Instead, after searching the 
factual record developed by the parties, it concludes that the safety interests have not 
been shown to exist as a matter of law." [d. at 450 (B1ackmun, J., concurring). The 
concurringJustices explained: "[I]f safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not 
second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related 
burdens on interstate commerce." [d. at 449 (Blackmun,J., concurring). Harking back to 
Bibb, the concurring opinion suggested that the Court had "been presented with another 
of those cases-'few in number'-in which highway safety regulations unconstitutionally 
burden interstate commerce." [d. at 451 (B1ackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Bibb v. 
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959». 
188. As noted previously, under the Unitary Framework, the historical deference to 
state highway statutes has currency only during the first·stage "Iegitimate-state-purpose" 
step. Once the inquiry proceeds to the Unitary Framework's second-stage balancing step, 
the statute is analyzed as is any statute with a legitimate purpose--simply by whether it is 
"evenhanded" or "discriminatory" in its application. 
In light of the deference given a State's articulated purpose in stage one of the 
analysis, the Rayrrwnd regulations are passed to the Unitary Framework's stage-two 
balancing despite the Court's doubts regarding Wisconsin's true purpose in enacting the 
regulations. See supra note 186. 
189. The Court noted that "[a]t least one of the exceptions [to enforcement of the 
regulations] discriminates on its face in favor of Wisconsin industries and against the 
industries of other states, ... and a number of the other exceptions, although neutral on 
their face, were enacted at the instance of, and primarily benefit, important Wisconsin 
industries." Raymond, 434 U.S. at 44647. Accordingly, under Professor Eule's OIP 
formulation, see supra note 120, these regulations taken in total might have an OIP of 80 
percent to 90 percent. 
190. Because the statute, after all of the exceptions are factored in, in effect favors in· 
staters, it is properly analyzed under Step 2(b) of the Unitary Framework. See infra notes 
212-14 and accompanying text for further discussion of why Raymond is properly analyzed 
under Step 2(b) of the Unitary Framework rather than under the evenhandedness 
inquiry of Step 2(a). 
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challenger then has the burden either of rebutting the State's 
justification or of demonstrating that the legitimate purpose can 
be served as well by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. 
Viewed through the Unitary Framework, because Wisconsin 
does not come close to meeting its initial burden of proving that 
the regulations are likely to lead to the achievement of the 
State's goal/91 the burden does not shift back to the challenger 
and the regulations are struck down in Step 2(b) (1). 
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,192 a plurality of the 
Court found that an Iowa state statute forbidding the use of 
sixty-five-foot tractor trailers on Iowa highways was an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 193 The 
plurality opinion again acknowledged the traditional deference 
given to state highway-safety regulations, but suggested that "less 
deference to the legislative judgment is due ... where the local 
regulation bears disproportionately on out-of-state residents and 
businesses.,,194 The Court balanced the burden to interstate 
commerce
195 
against the State's safety interest in maintaining the 
regulation, but seemed to require a heightened safety interest 
191. Indeed, the Court noted that Wisconsin "virtually defaulted in its defense of the 
regulations ... ." RaymmuJ, 434 U.S. at 444. 
192. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
193. See id. at 669. 
194. fd. at 675-76. The Court concluded that such a disproportionate effect existed in 
this case, given the several exemptions that allowed many Iowans to use sixty-five-foot 
doubles or longer singles on Iowa highways. See id. at 676. The Court opined that the 
exemptions may indeed have been enacted for discriminatory purposes instead of for 
safety purposes, pointing to the Governor's statement while vetoing a bill that would have 
allowed sixty-five-foot doubles in the State: "[W]ith this bill, the Legislature has pursued 
a course that would benefit only a few Iowa-based companies while providing a great 
advantage for out-of-state trucking firms and competitors at the expense of our Iowa 
citizens." fd. at 677. 
195. It is worth noting that one factor the Court has long considered important in 
ascertaining the magnitude of a state statute's burden on interstate commerce is to what 
degree the statute subjects activities to inconsistent regulations. In Kassel, the Court 
found important the fact that 
[u]nlike all other States in the West and Midwest, Iowa generally prohibits the 
use of 65-foot doubles within its borders .... Iowa's law is now out of step with 
the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States. Iowa thus substantially 
burdens the interstate flow of goods by truck. In the absence of congressional 
action to set uniform standards, some burdens associated with state safety 
regulations must be tolerated. 
fd. at 665, 671 (internal citations omitted); see also E.G. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 
624,642 (1982) (plurality opinion ofWhite,J.); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 
761,774 (1945); Cooleyv. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,319 (1851). 
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vis-a-vis the balancing test originally set out in Southern Pacific. 196 
Finding that Iowa had imposed the substantial burden on 
interstate commerce "without any significant countervailing 
safety interest,,,197 the Court struck down the Iowa statute. 
Kassel is marked by its divergence of opinion among the 
Justices, to the point where the dissent complains that the 
decision leaves "the jurisprudence of the 'negative side' of the 
Commerce Clause ... hopelessly confused.,,198 In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Brennan argued that ill deciding dormant-
commerce-clause cases involving state safety statutes, the Court 
should inquire into the State's motives in enacting the statute 
instead of engaging in a factual balancing. l99 In this case, 
because the Court found that Iowa's actual motivation had 
nothing to do with safety and everything to do with discouraging 
interstate truck traffic on Iowa's highways2°O and because 
"[p]rotectionist legislation is unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause, even if the burdens and benefits are related 
to safety rather than economics,,,2ot the Court found the safety 
advantages of the statute insufficient.202 By contrast, the dissent 
argued that because state safety measures are properly given a 
strong presumption of validity,203 and because, in this case, the 
196. Specifically, whereas in Southern Padjic the state transportation·safety statute 
would be upheld unless its total effect as a safety measure were so slight as to not outweigh 
the national interest in unimpeded interstate commerce, see Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 
775-76, the Kassel Court's "'weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the degree of 
interference with interstate commerce,'" Kasse~ 450 U.S. at 670 (quoting Raymond, 434 
U.S. at 443), seems to require something significantly greater than a "so slight" safety 
interest. See Kasse~ 450 U.S. at 693-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Iowa 
statute has clear safety benefits); see also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 
524 (1959) (stating that the "strong presumption of validity" given state highway-safety 
measures may be overcome only when the safety benefits were "'slight or problematical'" 
(quoting Southern Padfic, 325 U.S. at 776»; Rnymond, 434 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (stating that "if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not 
second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related 
burdens on interstate commerce"). 
197. Kasse~ 450 U.S. at 678-79. 
198. Id. at 706 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
199. See id. at 680, 681 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring). A corollary to the inquiry into 
the State's motives is the matter of court deference to the state legislative process: 
"[O]nce the court has established that the intended safety benefit is not illusory, 
insubstantial, or nonexistent, it must defer to the State's lawmakers on the appropriate 
balance to be struck against otherinterests." Id. at 681 n.1 (Brennan,J., concurring). 
200. See id. at 681 (Brennan,J., concurring). 
201. Id. at 680 (Brennan,J., concurring). 
202. See Kasse~ 450 U.S. at 681 (Brennan,J., concurring). 
203. See id. at 691 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 439 1997-1998
No.2] Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause 439 
State's safety justification was legitimate and not illusory,204 the 
Court should defer to the state legislation.205 Justice Rehnquist 
complained that "[t]he result in this case suggests ... that the 
only state truck-length limit 'that is valid is one which this Court 
has not been able to get its hands on. ",206 ' 
Under the Unitary Framework, because Iowa is deemed to 
have a legitimate state purpose in promoting highway safety,207 
the analysis of the Kassel statute proceeds to the stage-two 
balancing step. Because of the "disproportionate burden" on 
out-of-state residents and business20s and because ~e regulations 
impose their burdens primarily, but not exclusively, on out-of-
state interests,209 they are analyzed under the Unitary 
Framework's stage-two discriminatory-in-application (non-
exclusive) step (Step 2 (b)(l) ). Under this step, Iowa is unable to 
meet its burden of demonstrating that its regulations restricting 
65-foot doubles are substantially210 likely to lead to the legitimate 
goal of improved safety,211 and the measure is struck down 
without reaching the question of whether the challenger is able 
204. See id. at 692-95 (Rehnquist,j., dissenting). 
205. [d. at 687 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
206. [d. (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (quotingJungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 
560,572 (1949) Uackson,J., dissenting». 
207. The Court had its doubts as to Iowa's true purpose in enacting the statute: 
"Iowa's statute may not have been designed to ban dangerous trucks, but rather to 
discourage interstate truck traffic .... It is thus far from clear that Iowa was motivated 
primarily by [safety considerations]." Kasse~ 450 U.S. at 677 (plurality opinion). Had the 
Court been more definite in its assertions than noting merely that "Iowa's statute may not 
have been designed ... " and "[ilt is thus far from clear • •• ," see supra, the statute might 
be struck down in the Unitary Framework's stage-one legitimate-state-interest step 
instead of stage two. In the end, however, the statute is deemed to have a legitimate state 
purpose due to the traditional deference given state highway safety statutes. See supra 
note 158. 
208. Kasse~ 450 U.S. at 676. 
209. The Court concluded that "the local regulation bears disproportionally on out-of-
state residents and businesses," given the exemptions allowing many (but not all) Iowans 
to use sixty-five-foot trucks on Iowa's highways. [d. at 675-76. These regulations, when 
considered with their exemptions, might, like those in Raymond, have an OIP of 80 
percent to 90 percent. See supra note 120. 
210. With an OIP of 80 percent to 90 percent, the State has a relatively heavy burden 
of showing with some degree of certainty that the desired safety goal is likely to be 
attained. See supra note 127. 
211. The Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the "evidence clearly 
establishes that the twin is as safe as the semi," pointing to several statistical studies and 
to strong expert testimony supporting this conclusion. Kasse~ 450 U.S. at 672-73. The 
Court concluded that "Iowa made a more serious effort to support the safety rationale of 
its law than did Wisconsin in Raymond, but its effort was no more persuasive." [d. at 671-
72. Accordingly, Iowa does not meet its burden under Step 2(b) (2). 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 440 1997-1998
440 Haroard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 21 
to demonstrate the existence of equally effective 
nondiscriminatory means. 
It should be explained that Raymond and Kassel are properly 
analyzed under the stage-two "discriminatory-in-application" step 
of the Unitary Framework (Step 2 (b» despite the standards the 
Court actually set out in deciding the cases. Specifically, in 
Raymond, the Court cited Southern Pacific and Bibb for the 
proposition that the Court must give a state highway measure a 
high degree of deference and uphold the measure unless the 
safety benefits are '''so slight or problematical as not to outweigh 
the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from 
interferences which seriously impede it. ",212 In Kassel, the Court 
explained that to determine the constitutionality of a state safety 
statute, it is necessary to conduct a "'weighing of the asserted 
safety purpose against the degree of interference with interstate 
commerce. ",213 Although it might appear at first blush that these 
standards are more in keeping with the standard set out in the 
Unitary Framework's evenhanded-balancing step-that is, an 
evenhanded statute will be "upheld unless the burden is clearly 
excessive in relation to the state benefits"-the plain fact is that 
the Court found that the measures at issue in these two cases 
were not evenhanded.214 Thus, to apply the Pike test for 
evenhanded statutes makes little sense, and, in the interest of 
achieving the consistent judicial approach advocated by the 
Unitary Framework, the measures must be analyzed in the 
discriminatory-in-application step. 
2. State Regulations Requiring Business operations 
to Be Done In-State 
Another class of dormant-commerce-clause cases involves state 
regulations which require business operations to be conducted 
in the regulating State. In the leading case in this area, Pille v. 
Bruce Church, Inc.,215 an Arizona agricultural official issued an 
order, pursuant to a state deceptive-packaging statute, 
forbidding a company that grew superior-quality cantaloupes in 
Arizona from shipping the fruit across state borders without first 
212. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1978) (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959». 
213. Kasse~ 450 U.S. at 670 (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443). 
214. See supra notes 189,194. 
215. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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packaging them in approved containers bearing the Arizona 
state name. The effect of the order on the company, which 
normally shipped the cantaloupes to its California packaging 
plant, would have been to force it to spend $200,000 to build a 
packaging plant in Arizona and to do the packaging in Arizona 
instead of in its existing California facility.216 The Court stated 
that it "view[s] with particular suspicion state statutes requiring 
business operations to be performed in the home State that 
could more efficiently be performed elsewhere," and that 
"[e]ven where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local 
interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared 
to be virtually per se illegal.,,217 Suggesting that the presumption 
could have been overcome had Arizona's interest been more 
compelling,218 the Court in the end held that the order was 
unconstitutional because the burden it imposed on interstate 
commerce outweighed the State's interest.219 
Analyzed under the Unitary Framework, the order in Pike has 
a legitimate state purpose,220 and the inquiry proceeds to the 
216. See id. 
217. ld. at 145; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 405 (1948) (striking down a 
South Carolina statute requiring that shrimp caught off its coast be unloaded, packed, 
and stamped at a South Carolina port, reasoning that the State's true purpose was "to 
stimulate interstate shipments and sales as a means of increasing the employment and 
income of its shrimp industry"); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 
(1928) (holding invalid a Louisiana statute forbidding the expon of shrimp heads and 
hulls on grounds that the State's true purpose was to force packing and canning 
processors to operate within Louisiana). 
218. The Coun conceded that the State's interest in "requir[ing] that interstate 
cantaloupe purchasers be informed that,this high quality Parker fruit was grown in 
ArizonaH was legitimate, but termed it "minimal at best.H Pike, 397 U.S. at 144-46. 
219. See id. at 145. Ironically, although Pike sets out the test that has become famous as 
the proper approach to be used in determining the validity of evenhanded measures 
(indeed, the Unitary Framework's stage-two analysis for evenhanded statutes is based 
upon the Pike test), the order actually at issue in the case was itself discriminatcT)-in-
application, and the case was thus not decided according to the "Pike test. H The Coun's 
oft-cited Pike balancing test states: 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, 
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that 
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest 
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities. 
ld. at 142 (internal citations omitted). 
220. The Coun grudgingly accepts as legitimate the purpose of the order at issue in 
Pike, noting that Arizona's stated purpose for the order was to inform "interstate 
cantaloupe purchasers .•. that [the appellee cantaloupe grower's] high quality ... fruit 
was grown in Arizona.H ld. at 144. The Coun concluded: "Although it is not easy to see 
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stage-two balancing step. Because the order imposes its 
discriminatory burden exclusively on out-of-state interests,221 it is 
analyzed under the Unitary Framework's stage-two 
discriminatory-in-application (exclusive) step (Step 2(b)(2». 
Under this step, a measure that is discriminatory in application 
is presumed to be invalid and will be struck down unless the 
State meets its burden of demonstrating that the measure is 
highly likely to achieve its legitimate purpose and that the 
purpose cannot be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
alternatives. Arizona easily would be able to demonstrate that 
the order is highly likely to achieve its purpose/22 but it would 
not meet its heightened burden of demonstrating that the 
order's purpose cannot be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.22S Accordingly, the statute is 
struck down under Step 2 (b) (2) of the Unitary Framework. 
In a particularly fractured and incoherent opinion, a majority 
of the Court in the recent C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown224 decision found unconstitutional a municipal 
ordinance requiring that all trash generated or brought into the 
community be processed at a local treatment plant.225 The 
avowed purpose of the ordinance was to provide for the 
financing of the waste treatment plant through the retention of 
collected fees.226 The Court explained that when faced with the 
task of determining the validity of a state or local ordinance that 
affects interstate commerce, it is necessary to consider two lines 
of analysis: "first, whether the ordinance discriminates against 
why the other growers of Arizona are entitled to benefit at the company's expense from 
the fact that it produces superior crops, we may assume that the asserted state interest is 
a legitimate one." [d. at 145. 
221. An order requiring companies to conduct packaging operations within the Sate 
clearly is not evenhanded in application, because it discriminates against companies that 
might otherwise conduct these activities out-of-state, whereas in-state companies would 
not be affected. 
222. Clearly, an order requiring that cantaloupes grown in Arizona be packaged in 
approved containers bearing the Arizona state name when they are to be shipped out-of-
state will achieve its purpose ofinforrning "interstate cantaloupe purchasers ..• that [the 
appellee cantaloupe grower's] high quality ... fruit was grown in Arizona." Pike, 397 U.S. 
at 144. 
223. For example, the State could offer a tax credit or other incentive to the grower to 
include the words "Grown in Arizona" on its shipping cartons. This alternative would be 
much less restrictive in that the grower would not be placed in the position of having to 
invest $200,000 in new packaging facilities. 
224. 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
225. See iii. at 386. 
226. Seeid. 
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interstate commerce; and second, whether the ordinance 
imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is 'clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. ",227 Because in 
conducting the first line of inquiry the Court found that the 
ordinance was discriminatory,228 the Court immediately struck 
down the ordinance and declared that it was unnecessary to 
proceed to the second line of analysis.229 It is worthy of note that 
it mattered not to the majority that many in-state trash 
processors were also deprived of the right to process the 
community's trash. To the majority, "[t]he ordinance is no less 
discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also 
covered by the prohibition .... Discrimination against interstate 
commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se 
. val'd ,,230 In I •••• 
Adopting the findings of the m~ority in C & A Carbone, the 
Clarkstown ordinance would be struck down in the first-stage 
"legitimate-state-purpose" step (Step 1) of the Unitary 
Framework. According to the majority, the ordinance had a 
discriminatory purpose: "The avowed purpose of the ordinance 
is to retain the processing fees ... by depriving competitors, 
including out-of-state firms, of access to a local market.,,231 Under 
the Unitary Framework, statutes having a clearly discriminatory 
purpose are absolutely per se invalid, and the Clarkstown 
ordinance is struck down 'without reaching stage two. 
By contrast, if we accept the contention of four of the nine 
Justices in C & A Carbone that the ordinance's purpose of 
retaining fees to pay for the construction of a waste treatinent 
facility was legitimate because it "[did] not give more favorable 
227. ld. at 390 (internal citations omitted) (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617, 624 (1978) (regarding the first line of inquiry), and quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 
(1970) (regarding the second line ofinquiry». 
228. The Court found that the ordinance was discriminatory both in purpose and 
effect: "The avowed purpose of the ordinance is to retain the processing fees .... 
Because it attains this goal by depriving competitors, including out-of-5tate firms, of 
access to a local market, we hold that the ... ordinance violates the Commerce Clause." 
Id.at386. 
229. See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390. 
230. ld. at 391-92. The concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed, suggesting that 
because the ordinance "[did] not give more favorable treatment to local interests as a 
group as compared to out-of-state or out-of..town economic interests," it was improper to 
characterize the ordinance as disCriminatory against interstate commerce. ld. at 404 
(O'Connor,]., concurring); see id. at 416 (Souter,]., dissenting). 
231. ld. at 386 (majority opinion). Also, "though the Clarkstown ordinance may not in 
explicit terms seek to regulate interstate commerce, it does so nonetheless by its practical 
effect and design," that is, by its purpose." ld. at 394. 
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treatment to local interests as a group as compared to out-of-
state or out-of-town economic interests,,,232 the ordinance would 
proceed to the Unitary Framework's stage-two balancing step. 
Because the ordinance imposes its burdens mostly, but not 
exclusively, on out-of-state interests/33 it is analyzed under the 
Unitary Framework's stage-two discriminatory-in-application 
(non-exclusive) step (Step 2(b)(1». Viewed as such, Clarkstown 
clearly meets its burden of demonstrating that its ordinance is 
likely to lead to the legitimate goal of collection of feesj234 
however, the challenger likely would be successful in 
demonstrating that the legitimate purpose can be served as well 
by available nondiscriminatory alternatives,235 and the measure is 
struck down under the Unitary Framework's Step 2(b) (1). 
3. State Regulations Involving Incoming Commerce 
Another type of dormant-commerce-clause case involves state 
statutes that restrict access to local markets in some way. The 
Court has determined that the threshold analytical issue in this 
"incoming commerce" class of cases is whether the state measure 
h di . . ffi 236 as a scrumnatory purpose or e ect. 
232. ld. at 404 (O'Connor,]., concurring); see also ieI. at 416 (Souter,J., dissenting). 
233. Many local and in-state trash processors, in addition to out-of-state processors, 
were deprived of the right to process the community's trash. See infra note 230 and 
accompanying text. Because virtually all in-state processors (all except for one, that is) 
along with all out-of-state trash processors were prohibited from processing Clarkstown's 
trash, this ordinance is not as disproportionally discriminatory as some. Accordingly, it 
might have an OIP of 55 percent to 60 percent. See supra note 120. 
234. With an OIP of 55 percent to 60 percent, the State has a relatively light burden of 
showing that the desired legitimate purpose is likely to be attained. See supra note 127. 
Here, the adopted means (retention of fees collected at the facility) are all but certain to 
achieve the desired legitimate purpose (to help pay for the facility). 
235. The Court notes that 
Clarkstown has any number of nondiscriminatory alternatives for addressing 
the health and environmental problems alleged to justify the ordinance in 
question. The most obvious would be uniform safety regulations enacted 
without the object to discriminate. These regulations would ensure that 
competitors like Carbone do not underprice the market by cutting corners on 
environmental safety. 
C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. Also, "the town could finance the project by imposing 
taXes, by issuing municipal bonds, or even by lowering its price for processing to a level 
competitive with other waste processing facilities." leI. at 405-406 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
236. The Court has spoken at times of discriminatory purpose and at other times of 
discriminatory ejJect. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 
n.15 (1981) (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (regarding 
discriminatory effect); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 
352-53 (1977) (regarding discriminatory purpose» (stating that "[a] court may find that 
a state law constitutes 'economic protectionism' on proof either of discriminatory effect, 
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In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,2S7 a unanimous Court struck 
down a New York statute that barred the retail sale within the 
State of out-of-state milk that had been purchased for less than a 
flxed minimum price,2!!8 reasoning that to allow such a measure 
would "set a barrier to traffic between one State and another as 
effective as if customs duties, equal to the price differential, had 
been laid upon the thing transported.,,2s9 Responding to New 
York's argument that the law was allowable under the State's 
police power because its primary purpose was to protect the 
supply of pure milk,240 the Court asserted that "the police power 
may [not] be used by the State of destination with the aim and 
effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition 
with the products of another State or the labor of its residents. 
Restrictions so contrived are an unreasonable clog upon the 
mobility of commerce.,,241 In short, the Court looked to the true 
purpose and effect of the statute, found them discriminatory, and 
thus struck down the statute.242 
or of discriminatory purpose" (citations omitted»; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 
511, 527 (1935) (holding unconstitutional a statute whose "aim and effect" was to 
establish an economic barrier against out-of-state competition). 
As we have seen, discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect are treated quite 
separately and distinctly under the Unitary Framework. See supra notes 112-16 and 
accompanying text. 
237. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
238. See id. at 519. "The substance of the provision is that ... there shall be no sale 
within the state of milk bought outside unless the price paid to the producers was one 
that would be lawful upon a like transaction within the state." ld. The effect of the 
provision was to protect New York milk producers from lower out-of-state prices. 
239. ld. at 521. 
240. New York argued that the statute's purpose was "to make its inhabitants healthy, 
and not to make them rich." ld. at 523. Specifically, the State argued that 
[t]he end to be served is the maintenance of a regular and adequate supply of 
pure and wholesome milk, the supply being put in jeopardy when the farmers 
of the state are unable to earn a living income. Price security ... is only a 
special form of sanitary security; the economic motive is secondary and 
subordinate. 
ld. (citation omitted). The Coun noted New York's argument that "[e]conomic welfare is 
always related to health, for there can be no health if men are starving"; but if the Coun 
allowed such reasoning to prevail, "all that a state w[ould] have to do in times of stress 
and strain [would be] to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be 
protected against competition from without .... To give entrance to that excuse would 
be to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity." ld. 
241. ld. at 527. 
242. See also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941) (striking down a 
California statute whose "express purpose and inevitable effect is to prohibit the 
transportation of indigent persons across the California border," reasoning that "any 
single State [may not] isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining 
the transportation of persons and property across its borders"). 
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Under the Unitary Framework, the New York statute in Seelig 
would be struck down as absolutely per se illegal in the 
Framework's stage-one legitimate-state-purpose step (Step 1 (b)), 
due to the statute's clearly discriminatory purpose.243 This early 
case clearly illustrates the Court's aversion to statutes that are 
"hostile in conception": "[To allow such statutes would] invite a 
speedy end of our national solidarity. The Constitution was 
framed ... upon the theory that the peoples of the several states 
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity 
and salvation are in union and not division.,,244 Indeed, where 
there exists a discriminatory purpose, the statute is summarily 
struck down even ifit might be evenhanded in its application.245 
In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 246 the Court explained that 
a regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce will 
be struck down, even if it has a legitimate purpose, unless there 
are no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives available that 
will protect those interests.247 At issue was a Madison ordinance 
requiring that any milk sold as pasteurized in Madison must 
have been processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization 
plant within a five-mile radius of Madison.248 The Court noted 
that the avowed purpose of the ordinance, to protect 
consumers' health and safety by providing for proper sanitary 
conditions in the processing of milk and milk products, was 
legitimate, but concluded that the ordinance was unacceptable 
nonetheless because its practical effect was to exclude milk 
originating in Illinois from the Madison market.249 Because 
reasonable and adequate alternatives were available,250 the Court 
found the Madison ordinance unconstitutional. 
243. "New York is moved by the desire to protect her inhabitants from the cut prices 
and other consequences of Vermont competition." Seelig, 294 U.S. at 527. 
244. Jd. at 523. 
245. Although the Seelig Coun did not address the issue, the New York statute at issue 
arguably was evenhanded in application because it set up a system of minimum prices to 
be paid by dealers to producers regardless of the milk's origin. 111. at 519. 
246. 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
247. See id. at 353-54 (citing Seelig, 294 U.S. at 527; Minnesota v. Barber. 136 U.S. 313. 
328 (1890». 
248. See id. at 350. 
249. See id. at 353-54. 
250. For example, the Coun explained that Madison could charge the Illinois 
producers actual costs for the Madison inspectors to travel to the Illinois production sites 
and that the standards set fonh in the United States Public Health Service's Model Milk 
Ordinance would adequately protect the milk supply while not discriminating against 
Illinois producers. See id. at 354.55. Indeed, the Coun noted that the Madison Health 
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The Madison ordinance has a legitimate purpose,251 so, under 
the Unitary Framework, the analysis proceeds to the stage-two 
balancing step. Because the ordinance imposes its burdens 
primarily, but not exclusively, on out-of-state interests,252 it is 
analyzed under the Unitary Framework's stage-two 
discriminatory-in-application (non-exclusive) step (Step 
2 (b) (1) ). Here, Madison meets its burden of demonstrating that 
its ordinance is likely to lead to the achievement of the 
legitimate goal of protecting consumers' health and safety;253 but 
the challenger likely would be successful in demonstrating that 
the legitimate purpose can be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives,254 and the measure is struck 
down under the Unitary Framework's Step 2(b) (1). 
By contrast, when the Court has found that the purpose and 
effect of a state measure concerning incoming commerce are 
nondiscriminatory, it has been more likely to uphold the 
measure. For example, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery CO.,255 
the Court reviewed the validity of a Minnesota statute that 
banned the retail sale of milk in plastic, non-returnable 
containers. The statute had been enacted for the stated 
purposes of promoting resource conservation, easing solid-waste 
disposal problems, and conserving energy.256 Concluding that 
the statute was nondiscriminatory in purpose as well as in 
Commissioner testified that Madison consumers "would be safeguarded adequately" 
under either the disputed Madison ordinance or the Model Ordinance. [d. at 356. 
251. "Nor can there be objection to the avowed purpose of this enactment ... , 
'[which] may appropriately be regulated in the interest of the safety, health and well-
being of local communities ... .'" Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 353 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943». 
252. The ordinance has the "practical effect [of] exc1ud[ing] from distribution in 
Madison wholesome milk produced and pasteurized in Illinois." [d. at 354. That said, a 
great many in-state producers (all those whose processing and bottling facilities were 
located outside a five-mile radius of Madison), along with out-of-state producers, were 
prohibited from selling their milk in Madison. Accordingly, this ordinance is moderately 
disproportional in its discriminatory effect and might be said to have an OIP of 65 
percent to 70 percent. See supra note 120. 
253. There is an adequate correlation between the adopted means (prohibiting the 
sale of milk from outside a five-mile radius of the city) and the desired legitimate 
purpose (enhanced consumer health and safety) to enable Madison to meet its burden 
here. With an OIP of 65 percent to 70 percent, the State has a moderate burden of 
showing that the desired legitimate purpose is likely to be attained. See supra note 127 
and accompanying text. 
254. See supra note 250 for the Court's description of two reasonable and adequate 
nondiSCriminatory alternatives to the Madison ordinance. 
255. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
256. See id. at 458-59. 
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efi'ect,257 the Court proceeded to another line of inquiry-that is, 
"whether the incidental burden imposed on interstate 
commerce by the Minnesota Act is 'clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits. ",258 The Court concluded that the 
burden imposed by the statute was not clearly excessive in 
relation to the local benefit and, moreover, that there was no 
viable nondiscriminatory alternative available,259 and it thus 
upheld the statute.260 
Viewed in the context of the Unitary Framework, Clover Leaf 
Creamery is upheld under the stage-two evenhanded balancing 
step (Step 2 (a». First, the statute serves the legitimate state 
purpose of promoting conservation and easing solid-waste 
disposal problems,261 and the inquiry proceeds to the stage-two 
balancing step. The statute is evenhanded in its application,262 
and, under the Unitary Framework, it is presumed valid and is 
upheld unless the statute's challenger proves that the burden on 
interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the State 
benefits.263 Because "[t]he burden imposed on interstate 
commerce by the statute is relatively minor .... [and the] 
burden [on out-of-state competitors] is not 'clearly excessive' in 
light of the substantial state interest in promoting conservation 
of energy and other natural resources and easing solid waste 
257. The Court concluded that the statute in effect ·'regulates evenhandedly' by 
prohibiting all milk retailers from selling their products in plastic, nonreturnable milk 
containers, without regard to whether the milk, the containers or the sellers are from 
outside the State." [d. at 471-72. 
258. See ill. at 472 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 132, 142 (1970». 
259. See id. at 473-74. 
260. [d. at 474. The Court acknowledged that the Act might affect the out-of-state 
plastics industry relatively more than the Minnesota pulpwood industry, but explained 
that 
[a] nondiscriminatory regulation serving substantial state purposes is not 
invalid simply because it causes some business to shift from a predominantly 
out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state industry. Only if the burden on 
interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State's legitimate purposes does such 
a regulation violate the Commerce Clause. 
[d. In short, the Commerce Clause ·'protects the interstate market, not particular 
interstate finns, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.'" [d. (quoting Exxon Corp. 
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978». But see Lewis v. BT Investment 
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (striking down a Florida statute that barred out-of-
state banks from controlling in-state investment advisory finns). 
261. See Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 463 n.7, 471 n.15. 
262. See ill. at 471·72; see also supra note 257. 
263. See Pike at 142; see also, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); note 123 and accompanying text. 
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disposal problems,,,264 the statute is upheld under the Unitary 
Framework. 
4. State Regulations Involving Quarantines or Public Health 
Another type of dormant-commerce-clause case involves state 
quarantine or public health statutes. The early case of Mintz v. 
Baldwin,265 for example, dealt with a New York law requiring that 
cattle over six months old that were imported into New York for 
breeding or dairy purposes come from herds certified to be free 
from Bang's disease.266 In considering this state order, the Court 
asserted: 
Undoubtedly [the order] was promulgated in good faith and 
is appropriate for the prevention of further spread of the 
disease among dairy cattle and to safeguard public health. It 
cannot be maintained therefore that the order so 
unnecessarily burdens interstate transportation as to 
contravene the commerce clause. Unless limited by the 
exercise of federal authority under the commerce clause, the 
267 State has power to make and enforce the order. 
In so holding, the Court established a standard of virtual per se 
validity for such inspection measures; under Mintz, as long as the 
statute has a legitimate public health purpose and effect, the 
Court will uphold it.268 
Analyzed under the Unitary Framework, the statute in Mintz 
passes the stage-one legitimate-state-interest tese69 and proceeds 
to the stage-two balancing step. There the statute is analyzed 
under the Unitary Framework's stage-two discriminatory-in-
application (exclusive) test (Step 2 (b )(2) ), because its practical 
effect is to require that all cows coming into New York from 
outside the State be inspected for Bang's disease, whereas no 
264. Clover Lea/Creamery, 449 U.S. at 472-73. 
265. 289 U.S. 346 (1933). 
266. See iii. at 347 n.1. 
267. ld. at 349-50 (citations omitted). 
268. It is important to note that Mintz was decided before the Court expli~itly began to 
balance the local interest against the burden to interstate commerce. See supra notes 167-
7l and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test as set out explicitly for the first 
time in Southern Pacific). It is likely that the Court would engage in some sort of balancing 
if this case were decided today. 
269. The statute at issue is an inspection measure that seeks to prevent the "further 
spread of [Bang's] disease among dairy cattle and to safeguard public health" and is 
"undoubtedly ... promulgated in good faith." Mintz, 289 U.S. at 349-50. 
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such requirement exists for in-state COWS.270 A statute that 
discriminates exclusively against out-of-state interests is 
presumed to be invalid and will be struck down unless the State 
meets its burden of demonstrating that the measure is highly 
likely to achieve its legitimate purpose and that the purpose 
cannot be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
alternatives. New York would be able to demonstrate that its 
measure is highly likely to achieve its purpose.271 Moreover, 
because there is presumably no available means of preventing 
the importation of cows with Bang's disease other than requiring 
them to be certified as free from disease before they are allowed 
into the State, New York likely would meet its burden of 
demonstrating the absence of available nondiscriminatory 
alternatives. Accordingly, the statute is upheld under Step 
2(b)(2) of the Unitary Framework. The Mintz-type quarantine 
thus is an example of the somewhat unusual case where a 
measure that discriminates exclusively against out-of-state 
interests will be upheld under the Unitary Framework. 
More recently, in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,272 the Court 
considered the validity of a New Jersey statute that prohibited 
the importation of solid or liquid waste from outside the State. 
The statute's avowed purpose was to protect public health, 
safety, and welfare,273 but appellants asserted that the statute's 
270. See id. at 347 n.1. Measures that discriminate exclusively against out-of·state 
interests have an OIP of 100 percent. See supra note 120. 
Indeed, the statute at issue in Mintz might be analyzed under the Step 2(c) test for 
facially discriminatory statutes because the statute on its face only requires out-of-state 
cows to be certified as disease-free. Mintz is the rare case where a statute discriminatory 
on its face nonetheless has a legitimate purpose and ultimately survives Step 2(c) 
scrutiny. 
271. A measure requiring that cows be certified as coming from disease-free herds 
(the means) is highly likely to result in a reduction in the further spread of disease 
among cattle and in a corresponding safeguarding of public health (the legitimate 
purpose). 
272. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
273. See id. at 625. Injustifying the statute, the New Jersey legislature reasoned: 
[T]hat the volume of solid and liquid waste continues to rapidly increase, that 
the treatment and disposal of these wastes continues to pose an even greater 
threat to the quality of the environment of New Jersey, that the available and 
appropriate land fill sites within the State are being diminished, that the 
environment continues to be threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste 
which originated or was collected outside the State, and that the public health, 
safety and welfare require that the treatment and disposal within this State of all 
wastes generated outside of the State be prohibited. 
Id. at 625 (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1I·9 (West Supp. 1978». 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 451 1997-1998
No.2] Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce. Clause 451 
actual purpose was primanly economic.274 According to the 
Court, however, the statute's purpose was immaterial; that is, it 
mattered not whether the statute was enacted for public health 
or economic purposes. Rather, the relevant inquiry was whether 
the statute in plain effect discriminated against articles of 
commerce coming from outside the State,275 because the Court 
had earlier established the principle that "where simple 
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually 
per-se rule of invalidity has been erected.,,276 By contrast, the Court 
explained that, where the state law is not overtly discriminatory, 
the applicable test is the one laid out in pike.277 The Court 
determined that the New Jersey statute was discriminatory both 
on its face and in its plain effect, because "[0] n its face, [the 
statute] imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full 
274. See id. at 625-26. Specifically, appellants argued that the statute, "while outwardly 
cloaked 'in the currently fashionable garb of environmental protection,' ... is actually 
no more than a legislative effon to suppress competition and stabilize the cost of solid 
waste disposal for New Jersey residents." Id. (quoting appellants' brief). 
275. See id. at 626-27. 
276. Id. at 624 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 
(1949); Toomerv. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948); Baldwin v. GAF. Seelig, Inc., 294 
U.S. 511, 527 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925». 
Moreover, the Coun more recently has clarified the principle that once a state 
measure is determined to be patently discriminatory,. from an analytical standpoint the 
magnitude of the discrimination does not matter-the measure is invalid in any case. In 
striking down an Oklahoma law requiring Oklahoma power plants serving state 
customers to bum at least ten percent Oklahoma coal, for example, the Coun explained: 
"The volume of commerce affected measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of 
no relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated against interstate 
commerce." Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455-56 (1992) (citing Bacchus 
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1984); Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, 
Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 39-42 (1980». The Coun has also affirmed that 
where discrimination is patent, ... neither a widespread advantage to in-state 
interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-state competitors need be 
shown .... Varying the strength of the bar against economic protectionism 
according to the size and number of in-state and out-of-state firms affected 
would serve no purpose except the creation of new uncertainties in an already 
complex field. 
New Energy Co. ofIndiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276-77 (1988). 
277. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970». Quoting verbatim the Pike balancing test, the Coun said: 
Id. 
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, 
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that 
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest 
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities. 
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burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill space .... 
What is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a 
problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the 
movement of interstate trade.,,278 Accordingly, the Court applied 
a virtual per-se rule of invalidity and struck down the New Jersey 
statute.279 
Although Philadelphia and Mintz may appear to be 
inconsistent, one important distinction lies in the nature of the 
burden imposed on excluded out-of:state interests. In Mintz, the 
burden was, at most, the necessity of disposing of a few diseased 
cattle, whereas in Philadelphia, the burden on the neighboring 
State would be ever-growing mountains of trash with nowhere to 
gO.280 The key in determining the validity of a quarantine or 
health measure under the Court's existing doctrine is thus to 
consider the nature of the burden: whereas a State certainly may 
impose a quarantine-type measure,281 at the point the quarantine 
278. ld. at 628. 
279. See id; see also Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) 
(striking down an Alabama statute charging an additional fee for disposing of non-
Alabama waste at commercial landfills in the State, reasoning that Alabama could use less 
restrictive means to accomplish its legitimate state health, safety, and environmental 
interests); Fon Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 
504 U.S. 353 (1992) (finding invalid a state law prohibiting out-of-county waste 
generators from using private landfills without the county's prior approval, explaining 
that the statute's discriminatory character was not excused simply because it affected 
intrastate in addition to interstate movement of solid waste). 
280. The coun distinguished Philadelphia from other quarantine cases by noting: 
It is true that cenain quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden 
protectionist measures, even though they were directed against out-of-state 
commerce. But those quarantine laws banned the importation of articles such 
as diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible because their 
very movement risked contagion and other evils. Those laws thus did not 
discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic 
in noxious articles, whatever their origin .... [By contrast,) [t)he New Jersey law 
blocks the importation of waste in an obvious effort to saddle those outside the 
State with the entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse into New Jersey's 
remaining landfill sites. That legislative effort is clearly impermissible under the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628-29 (citations omitted); see generally TRIBE, supra note 8; 
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5. 
281. Indeed, the dissent in Philadelphia argued that the New Jersey statute at issue was 
a valid quarantine law of the son previously upheld in numerous other cases and that 
"such 'quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden protectionist measures, even 
though they were directed against out-ofstate commerce.'n Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 631 
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting id. at 626 (majority opinion), and 
citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 
52, 59-60 (1915); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Bowman v. Chicago & 
Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 
(1878». Accordingly, argued the dissent, the Coun should have given the state 
legislation great deference. See id. (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
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imposes a certain onerous burden on its neighbors, it becomes 
unacceptable. Simply put, States may not "fence out national 
problems.,,282 The Court's position is summed up well in one 
commentator's adaptation of Justice Cardozo's famous maxim: 
'" [T] he peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,' 
even in their collective garbage.,,283 
When Philadelphia is viewed under the Unitary Framework, 
because the State does not demonstrate a legitimate purpose,284 
the statute is struck down in the stage-one legitimate-state-
purpose step without reaching stage two. Assuming, for the sake 
of illustration, that New Jersey's avowed safety purpose is 
legitimate,285 the facially discriminatory statute286 is considered 
under the Unitary Framework's stage-two facially discriminatory 
step (Step 2(c)). The statute is held to be virtually per se invalid 
and will be struck dmvn unless the State is able to meet its heavy 
burden of demonstrating that the measure is virtually certain to 
achieve the legitimate purpose and that the purpose cannot be 
seIVed as well by available less discriminatory means. Here, the 
State likely would fail to meet its burden on both counts. 
Regarding the State's burden to demonstrate that the measure is 
virtually certain to achieve the desired health and safety 
purpose, the Court notes that "[t]here has been no claim here 
that the very movement of waste into or through New Jersey 
endangers health.,,287 Moreover, the State likely would be unable 
282. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 425. 
283. ld. at 426 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935»; see 
also supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
284. Mter stating that it was not necessary to determine the actual purpose of the 
statute, the Court noted the illegitimacy of purpose: 
There has been no claim here that the very movement of waste into or through 
New Jersey endangers health .... The New Jersey law blocks the importation of 
waste in an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with the entire 
burden of slowing the flow of refuse into New Jersey's remaining landfill sites. 
That legislative effort is clearly impermissible .... 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27, 629. 
285. Recall New Jersey's avowed purpose of protecting public health, safety, and 
welfare. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. Where there is any question on the 
matter of legitimacy of purpose, the Unitary Framework presumes the purpose is 
legitimate and passes the measure on to the stage-two balancing step. 
286. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
287. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 629. Moreover, waste from New Jersey has no 
restrictions placed upon it, even though "there is no basis to distinguish out-of-state waste 
from domestic waste." ld. 
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to prove that the purpose cannot be served as well by available 
I d · . . 288 ess Iscnmmatory means. 
5. State Regulations Involving Tax Subsidies and Credits 
Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause does not prohibit a 
State from subsidizing an industry out of funds collected from 
within the State.289 In such a case, the political process provides 
those paying for the subsidy-that is, the residents and other 
interests within the State-the opportunity to express their views 
regarding the wisdom of providing the subsidy.290 When the 
subsidy is funded from moneys collected from out-ofstate 
interests, however, the Court will view it more critically. For 
example, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,291 yet another case 
involving milk producers,292 the Court considered the validity of 
a Massachusetts tax-subsidy program imposing a tax on all milk 
sold by dealers to Massachusetts retailers293 and distributing the 
revenues exclusively to Massachusetts dairy farmers.294 The Court 
found the state program "clearly unconstitutional," explaining 
that it was discriminatory because its express purpose and effect 
were to enable higher-cost Massachusetts farmers to compete 
with lower-cost out-of-state farmers.295 
288. For example, the State could further its goal of decreasing the burden on its 
landfills by imposing higher dumping fees on in-state and out-of-state generators alike, 
which would encourage the generators to find ways to lessen the amount of garbage (for 
example, through more aggressive recycling programs, more diligent pre-sorting, and so 
on) to be dumped in New Jersey's landfills. 
289. See, e.g., New Energy Co. oflndiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (noting 
that "[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the 
Dormant Commerce Clause]"); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) 
(affirming that "[n]o one disputes that a State may enact laws pursuant to its police 
powers that have the purpose and effect of encouraging domestic industry"). But see West 
Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (implying that subsidies may be invalid 
under the Commerce Clause); infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of political policy 
considerations (the "inner political check") in the commerce-clause context. 
291. 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
292. A disproportionate number of dormant-commerce-clause cases considered by the 
Supreme Court have involved state regulations affecting the dairy industry. See id. at 206 
n.22 (observing that "[a] surprisingly large number of our Commerce Clause cases arose 
out of attempts to protect local dairy farmers" (citing Geoffrey P. Miller, The Industrial 
Organization of Political Production: A Case Study, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL 
ECON.769 (1993»). 
293. About two-thirds of the milk so taxed came from out-of-state. See id. at 188. 
294. See id. 
295. ld. at 194. In so holding, the Court rejected Massachusetts's principal argument 
that the overall state program was valid because each of its constituent elements was valid 
standing alone--that is, that the subsidies were constitutional exercises of state power 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 455 1997-1998
No.2] Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause 455 
Under the Unitary Framework, the West Lynn Creamery 
program would be struck down as absolutely per se illegal in the 
stage-one legitimate-state-purpose step (Step 1 (a)), due to the 
program's clearly discriminatory purpose.296 Accordingly, it is 
unnecessary to reach the stage-two balancing step. This recent 
case highlights the Court's aversion to statutes that would 
"violat[e] the cardinal principle that a State may not 'benefit in-
state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors,,,,297 and its continued fidelity to fundamental 
notions of national unity.2gB 
Similarly, in New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,299 the Court 
struck down an Ohio tax-credit measure that operated as a 
subsidy to in-state and certain out-of-state fuel dealers.soo The 
and that the tax was nondiscriminatory-explaining that the tax-subsidy program 
"violates the cardinal' principle that a State may not 'benefit in-state economic interests 
by burdening out-of-state competitors.'" Id. at 199 (quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. 
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988». 
Notably, the Court's holding in West Lynn Creamery comes perilously close to banning 
in-state subsidies, a fact that was not lost on the Court's conservative wing. In dissent, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Massachusetts measure was a state subsidy, plain 
and simple, of the sort that the Court has approved "[i]n case after case." Id. at 213 
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). For his part, Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence that 
the majority's reasoning went too far in that it would find invalid virtually any state 
measure, such as a state subsidy, that "'artificially encourag[es] in-state production even 
when the same goods could be produced at lower cost in other States.'" Id. at 207 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (quoting id. at 193 (majority opinion». 
296. "[The statute's] avowed purpose and its undisputed effect are to enable higher 
cost Massachusetts dairy fanners to compete with lower-cost dairy farmers in other 
States .... [by] mak[ing] milk produced out-of-state more expensive." West Lynn 
Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 194 (m~ority opinion). 
297. Id. at 199 (quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-73 
(1988». 
298. The Court quoted classic passages from earlier Supreme Court dormant-
commerce-clause cases in support of its "overriding interest in [protecting] the free flow 
of commerce across state lines." Id. at 206. The Court noted: 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free 
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his 
exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude 
them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every 
producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was 
the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has 
given it reality. 
Id. at 206-07 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949»; see 
also id. at 2218 ("'The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political 
philosophy ... that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that 
in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.'" (quoting 
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935»). 
299. 486 U.S. 269 (1988). 
300. The Ohio measure awarded a tax credit against the Ohio fuel sales tax for each 
gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers, but only if the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in 
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Court repeated the rule that state measures clearly 
discriminating against interstate commerce will be struck downso, 
unless the State is able to show that the measure "advances a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."W2 Finding first that 
the tax credit was facially discriminatory,S03 the Court concluded 
that Ohio's avowed purposeS04 was "no more than implausible 
speculation, which does not suffice to validate this plain 
discrimination against products of out-of-state manufacture. "S05 
Under the Unitary Framework, because Ohio does not 
demonstrate a legitimate purpose,W6 the statute is said to be 
absolutely per se invalid under the stage-one legitimate-state-
purpose step. Accordingly, the statute is summarily struck down 
without reaching stage two. 
--------------------------~ ~-~---
a State that granted reciprocal tax credits for fuel produced in Ohio. The tax credit thus 
operated in effect as a subsidy to in-state and certain out-of-state fuel dealers. See id. at 
27l. 
301. See id. at 274 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982): 
Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980): Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 
340 U.S. 349 (1951». 
302. Id. at 278 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986): Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958: 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979): Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354). The 
Court noted that the standards for such justification are high, "'at a 
minimum ... invok[ing] the strictest scrutiny.'" Id. at 279 (quoting Hughes, 441 U.S. at 
337). 
303. The provision was discriminatory on its face, the Court explained, because it 
"explicitly deprives certain products of generally available beneficial tax treatment 
because they are made in certain other States." Id. at 274. The Court rejected the State's 
contention that the availability of the tax credit to out-of-state manufacturers from 
reciprocating States made this a non-<iiscriminatory statute, noting that similar reciprocal 
arrangements had been found discriminatory elsewhere. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958 
(striking down a Nebraska statute requiring reciprocity for the export of groundwater 
from the State as "facially discriminatory legislation" meriting the "'strictest scrutiny'" 
(internal citations omitted»: Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 
379 (1976) (striking down a Mississippi regulation permitting out-of-state milk to be sold 
in Mississippi only if the other State accepted Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis, 
reasoning that "Mississippi may not use the threat of economic isolation as a weapon to 
force sister States to enter into even a desirable reciprocity agreement"). 
304. Ohio argued that its purpose in enacting the ethanol ta.x-credit program was 
twofold: one, that the program would promote health by reducing harmful exhaust 
emissions: and two, that the program would increase commerce in ethanol by 
encouraging other States to enact ethanol subsidies. See Limbach, 486 U.S. at 279-80. 
305. Id. at 280. In finding that the local purposes were not legitimate, the Court did 
not reach the second part of the test it had laid out-that is, whether there was a less 
restrictive alternative available. 
306. The Court noted that Ohio's avowed purpose, see supra note 304, was "no more 
than implausible speculation, which does not suffice to validate this plain discrimination 
against products of out-of-state manufacture." Limbach, 486 U.S. at 280. 
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6. State Regulations Involving Outgoing Commerce and 
Preserving Resources for In-State Consumption 
Another group of state regulations affected by dormant-
commerce-clause considerations are those that seek to place 
restrictions on the export of local products to other States. The 
statute at issue in Hughes v. Oklahomaso7 prohibited all persons 
from exporting natural minnows out of Oklahoma for sale.SOB 
The Court stated that such state measures are subject to the test 
originally expressed in Pike/09 to wit: an evenhanded statute that 
is designed to serve a legitimate local interest and that only 
incidentally burdens interstate commerce will be upheld unless 
the burden to interstate commerce is clearly excessive vis-a-vis 
the local benefits.slo The Court interpreted the Pike test to 
require the following line of inquiry: 
(1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly 
with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or 
instead discriminates against interstate commerce either on 
its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a 
legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative 
means could promote this local purpose as well without 
discriminating against interstate commerce.SII 
Because it found that the Oklahoma statute facially 
discriminated against interstate commerce,312 the Court declared 
307. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
308. See id. at 323. 
309. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also supra notes 215-19 
and accompanying text. 
310. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 331 (quoting the Pike balancing test, see supra note 219). 
Under the Pike balancing test, once a legitimate local purpose is found, the extent of the 
burden that will be tolerated depends on two factors: (1) the nature of the local interest 
involved, and (2) whether the local interest could be promoted as well with a less 
restrictive alternative. ld. 
311. ld. at 336. The Court noted: 
[T]he burden to show discrimination rests on the party challenging the validity 
of the statute, but '[w]hen discrimination against commerce ... is 
demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justifY it both in terms of the 
local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of non-
discriminatory alternatives adequate to preseIVe the local interests at stake.' 
ld. (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977». 
312. The Court explained that the statute was facially discriminatory because it 
"forbids the transportation of natural minnows out of the State for purposes of sale, and 
thus 'overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State's borders.'" ld. at 336-
37 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978». By contrast, Justice 
Rehnquist argued in dissent that the statute is not in fact facially disCriminatory, nor even 
discriminatory in effect: "This is not a case where a State's regulation permits residents to 
export naturally seined minnows but prohibits nonresidents from so doing. No person is 
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that the rest of the inquiry would be subject to a standard of 
strictest scrutiny.313 The Court then found that Oklahoma's 
"interest in maintaining the ecological balance in state waters by 
avoiding the removal of inordinate numbers of minnows may 
well qualify as a legitimate local purpose,,,SI4 thus satisfying part 
two of the inquiry. But the Court struck down the statute 
because it failed part three of the inquiry-that is, "[f] ar from 
choosing the least discriminatory alternative, Oklahoma has 
chosen to 'conserve' its minnows in the way that most overtly 
discriminates against interstate commerce."SI5 
The statute involved in Hughes, the avowed purpose of which 
is to provide for the conservation and protection of wild 
animals,sl6 passes the Unitary Framework's step-one legitimate-
state-purpose test, and it is considered under the stage-two 
facially discriminatory test (Step 2 (C)).317 The statute is held to 
be virtually per se invalid and will be struck down unless the State 
is able to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating that the 
measure is virtually certain to achieve the legitimate purpose 
and that the purpose cannot be served as well by available less 
discriminatory means. Here, the State's burden to demonstrate 
that the measure is virtually certain to achieve the desired health 
and safety purpose is met, because a prohibition on the export 
of minnows will serve to "avoid [] the removal of inordinate 
numbers of minnows .... "SI8 The statute fails and is struck down 
under the second part of the Step 2(c) test, however, because 
allowed to export natural minnows for sale outside of Oklahoma; the statute is 
evenhanded in its application." Id. at 344 (Rehnquist.] .• dissenting). 
313. See it!. at 337 (majority opinion). 
314. It!. The Court explained that it considers "States' interests in conservation and 
protection of wild animals as legitimate local purposes similar to the States' interests in 
protecting the health and safety of their citizens." It!. 
315. Hughes. 441 U.S. at 337-38. The Court observed that Oklahoma 
places no limits on the numbers of minnows that can be taken by licensed 
minnow dealers; nor does it limit in any way how these minnows may be 
disposed of within the State. Yet it forbids the transportation of any 
commercially significant number of natural minnows out of the State for sale. 
Id. at 338. 
316. Id. at 337. Because the Court considers such measures "as legitimate local 
purposes similar to the States' interests in protecting the health and safety of their 
citizens," id., under the Unitary Framework. the statute is given a heightened level of 
deference similar to that given other legitimate police power statutes. See supra note 151 
and accompanying text. 
317. Seesupranote312. 
318. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. 
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the State is unable to show that the purpose cannot be served as 
well by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.319 
By contrast, in Maine v. Taylor,320 the Court upheld a facially 
discriminatory statute explicitly prohibiting the importation of 
live baitfish into Maine from out of state,321 explaining that "the 
States retain authority under their general police powers to 
regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern,' even though 
interstate commerce may be affected.,,322 The Court applied the 
interpretation of the Pike test, developed in Hughes v. 
Oklahoma,323 whereby 
once a state law is shown to discriminate against interstate 
commerce "either on its face or in practical effect," the 
burden falls on the State to demonstrate both that the statute 
"serves a legitimate local purpose," and that this purpose 
could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 324 
means. 
Reasoning that Maine satisfied its burden by demonstrating that 
the statute had a legitimate purpose of guarding against the 
"imperfectly understood environmental risk" of introducing 
baitfish parasites and non-native species of fish,325 and that less-
discriminatory means were not currently available,326 the Court 
upheld the statute. 
319. "Far from choosing !he least discriminatory alternative, Oklahoma has chosen to 
'conserve' its minnows in !he way !hat most overtly discriminates against interstate 
commerce." ld. at 337-38; see also supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
320. 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
321. Seeid. 
322. ld. at 138 (quoting Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 
(1980». 
323. See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
324. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979». 
325. ld. at 148. The Court explained !hat: 
"[TJhe constitutional principles underlying !he commerce clause cannot be 
read as requiring !he State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially 
irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until !he scientific 
community agrees on what disease organisms are or are not dangerous before it 
acts to avoid such consequences." 
ld. at (quoting United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (Me. 1984». 
326. See id. at 143. The Court explained !hat !he 
"abstract possibility" of developing acceptable testing procedures, particularly 
when !here is no assurance as to !heir effectiveness, does not make !hose 
procedures an "available nondiscriminatory alternative" for purposes of !he 
Commerce Clause. A State must make reasonable efforts to avoid restraining 
!he free flow of commerce across its borders, but it is not required to develop 
new and unproven means of protection at an uncertain cost. 
ld. at 147 (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 
(1977». 
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Like the measure at issue in Hughes,S27 the statute in Taylor is 
analyzed first under the Unitary Framework's stage-one 
legitimate-state-purpose test (Step 1) and then under the stage-
two test for facially discriminatory statutes (Step 2(c) ).328 With its 
legitimate purpose of protecting the State's fish population from 
the unknown environmental risks of introducing baitfish 
parasites and non-native species of fish into state waters, the 
statute passes the step-one legitimate-state-purpose test and 
moves on to the Unitary Framework's Step 2(c) facially 
discriminatory test. The statute, which totally prohibits the 
importation of live baitfish from outside the State, is indeed 
virtually certain to achieve the purpose of protecting Maine's 
fish population from unknown environmental risks, and 
therefore the first part of Step 2(c) is satisfied; the State then 
meets the second part of the test by showing the unavailability of 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives.S29 Maine v. Taylor is 
thus one of the rare cases where a facially discriminatory 
measure is upheld under the Unitary Framework. 
7. State Regulations Involving Limits on Business Entry 
Still another type of state regulation that the Court has 
considered under the Commerce Clause are those measures that 
in some way limit out-of-state businesses from entering the home 
State. In Lewis v. BT Investment Managers,SSO the Court suggested 
that the initial point of inquiry in determining the validity of a 
law banning out-of-state banking holding companies from 
controlling in-state investment advisory firms is whether the 
effects of the state measure cause outright economic 
protectionism, in which case a virtually per-se rule of invalidity 
applies,3s1 or whether the statute "visits its effects equally upon 
both interstate and local business," in which case it may be 
found valid if narrowly drawn.ss2 Having set out the framework, 
the Court then concluded that the statute was protectionist in 
effect, but declined to decide whether the statute should be held 
327. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text 
328. See supra text accompanying note 321 (noting the statute's explicit prohibition of 
the importation oflive baitfish into Maine). 
329. See supra note 326 and accompanying text. 
330. 447 U.S. 27 (1980). 
331. See id. at 36 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978». 
332. ld. at 36-37 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970». 
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to be virtually per se invalid.333 Instead, the Court conducted a de 
facto balancing of the State's interest against the burden on 
interstate commerce and declared the statute 
unconstitutional.334 
The statute in BT Investment Managers, the avowed purpose of 
which is to prevent economic concentration and to protect the 
State's citizens from fraud, passes the Unitary Framework's 
legitimate-state-purpose test,335 and it is considered under the 
stage-two facially discriminatory test (Step 2(C)).336 The State 
likely fails both counts of Step 2 (c). First, although banning out-
of-state banking holding companies from controlling in-state 
investment advisory firms may offer some measure of protection 
to consumers, it clearly does not rise to the level of a virtual 
certainty. Moreover, the State is unable to show that the purpose 
cannot be served as well by available less discriminatory 
altematives,337 and the statute is struck down under Step 2(C).338 
333. See id. at 42. 
334. "[W]e are not persuaded that [the State's] interests justify the heavily 
disproportionate burden this statute places on bank holding companies that operate 
principally outside the State." [d. at 43; see also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco 
Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988) (striking down an Ohio statute suspending 
statute-of-limitation protections to out-of-state corporations or persons by tolling the 
running of the statute for any period during which the corporation or person was not 
"present" in the State, reasoning that "the burden imposed on interstate commerce by 
the tolling statute exceeds any local interest that the State might advance"). 
335. "Discouraging economic concentration and protecting the citizenry against fraud 
are undoubtedly legitimate state interests." BT Investment Managers, 447 U.s. at 43. This 
avowed purpose, part of which clearly is to favor in-state economic interests, arguably is 
discriminatory in purpose and might be struck down as precisely the sort of regulation 
the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent. On the other hand, the State's purpose 
does have legitimate aspects-protection of citizens from fraud, for example. Because 
the measure does have some legitimacy, it is proper to allow it to proceed to the next 
part of the burden. 
336. The Florida measure creates an outright ban on out-of-state banking holding 
companies from controlling in-state investment advisory firms. See id. at 31. "Both on its 
face and in actual effect, [the statute] thus displays a local favoritism or 
protectionism .... " Id. at 42. 
337. Possible less-d.iscriminatory alternatives that would serve the purpose of 
protecting residents from fraud include licensing requirements or posting of bonds for 
aU holding companies, whether from in-state or out-of-state. 
338. If the reader is left with the impression after reviewing the Unitary Framework's 
treatment of the individual dormant-commerce-clause cases that the analysis is 
redundant or repetitive, that is precisely the point. Virtually all of the Court's dormant-
commerce-clause cases are capable of being analyzed under the single Unitary 
Framework. 
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8. Points of Departure 
It should be noted that the Unitary Framework does not apply 
in the exact form presented here to two sorts of state regulations 
impacting interstate commerce: (1) state regulations involving 
taxation; and (2) state regulations where the State is a "market 
participant." First, where the state regulation at issue involves a 
state tax, the Court has developed a separate doctrinal test 
whereby discrimination against interstate commerce is but one 
of several criteria used in determining if the tax is permissible.ss9 
The Unitary Framework analysis is embedded, in effect, within 
the third element of the Complete Auto test. Secondly, the Court 
has determined that the Dormant Commerce Clause does not 
apply when a State is acting as a "market participant,,,340 at which 
point it becomes a moot point whether the regulation at issue 
violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.541 Accordingly, once the 
State has been determined to be a "market participant," it is 
unnecessary to apply the Unitary Framework. 
D. The Unitary Framework Applied to Prospective Jurisprudence 
Finally, any analytical framework that professes to be an 
accurate descriptor and predictor of a body of jurisprudence 
must be capable of withstanding a strict scrutiny of its own. In 
particular, it must be able to accommodate the Court's existing 
jurisprudence and to provide a useful template for courts to use 
339. A state tax is pennissible "when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial 
nexus with the taXing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). At issue in Complete Auto Transit was a 
Mississippi sales tax that was imposed on businesses "for the privilege of engaging or 
continuing in business or doing business within this state .•.. " ld. at 275 (quoting MISS. 
CODE ANN., 1942 § 10105 (1972 Supp.), as amended). 
340. Compare, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 
460 U.S. 204 (1983) (holding that a city spending its own funds on construction 
contracts for a public project is acting as a market participant and is not subject to the 
Donnant Commerce Clause); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (holding that a 
State owning and operating a cement plant is a market participant and is thus outside 
the purview of the Donnant Commerce Clause); with South-Central Timber 
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (concluding that where the State 
merely regulates the market, it is not a market participant and donnant-commerce-clause 
limitations do apply). 
341. See, generally, Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 397 (1989) (explaining that in the last 
two decades, "the Court has lifted [donnant-commerce-clause] prohibitions when states 
act as 'market participants' rather than as 'market regulators,' •.. [and] has shielded 
from commerce clause attack blatant favoritism of local interests"). 
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in future decisions. This Article's Unitary Framework succeeds 
on both counts. 
As a paradigm for applying the Unitary Framework to 
prospective dormant-commerce-clause cases, consider seven 
possible different discriminatory statutes: (1) discriminatory in 
purpose only; (2) discriminatory in purpose and in effect; (3) 
discriminatory in purpose, in effect, and on its face; (4) 
discriminatory in effect and on its face; (5) discriminatory on its 
face only; (6) discriminatory in effect only, imposing its burden 
mostly, although not exclusively, on out-of-state interests; (7) 
discriminatory in effect only, imposing its burden exclusively on 
out-of:.state interests. 
The statutes in scenarios (1), (2), and (3) would be struck 
down immediately in the Unitary Framework's stage-one 
"legitimate-state-purpose" step (Step 1), because, by Unitary-
Framework definition, a statute that has a discriminatory 
purpose does not further a legitimate state purpose and is 
absolutely per se invalid. Beyond the fact that discriminatory 
effect or facial discrimination is highly probative evidence of 
discriminatory purpose, it is immaterial that a statute 
discriminatory in purpose mayor may not also be discriminatory 
in effect and on its face (as in scenarios (2) and (3»; once it is 
determined that the statute's purpose is discriminatory, the 
statute is struck down. 
The statutes in scenarios (4)342 and (5) would be struck down 
under the Unitary Framework's stage-two facial discrimination 
test (Step 2(c» unless the State were able to overcome the 
statute's virtual per-se-invalid status. To do this, the State must 
demonstrate that the statute is virtually certain to achieve its 
desired legitimate purpose343 and that the purpose could not be 
served as well by available less discriminatory alternatives. 
342. Beyond any probative value that evidence of discriminatory effect might have in 
proving facial discrimination, it is immaterial that a facially discriminatory statute may 
also be discriminatory in effect (as in scenario (4». If it is determined that the statute is 
facially discriminatory, and the State is unable to overcome the heavy presumption of 
virtual per-se invalidity, the statute is struck down in the Unitary Framework's facial 
discrimination step (step 2(c». 
343. Recall that it is unlikely that a facially discriminatory statute will ever get to the 
Unitary Framework's stage-two balancing step because it likely will have been found not 
to have a legitim .. te state purpose and will have been struck down in the stage-one 
legitimate-state-purpose step (Step 1). See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Facial 
discrimination is highly probative evidence of discriminatory purpose. 
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The statute in scenario (6) would more likely than not be 
struck down in the Unitary Framework's stage-two 
discriminatory-in-application (not exclusive) balancing inquiry 
(Step 2(b)(1». The statute is presumed to be invalid and is 
struck down unless the State meets its burden of demonstrating 
that the measure is likely to achieve the desired legitimate 
purpose, and (if the State is able to meet its burden) unless the 
challenger either rebuts the State's justification or demonstrates 
that the State's purpose can be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 
The statute in scenario (7) would most likely be struck down 
in the Unitary Framework's discriminatory-in-application 
(exclusive) balancing inquiry (Step 2 (b )(2) ). The statute is 
presumed to be invalid and is struck down unless the State is 
able to meet its heightened burden of demonstrating that the 
measure is highly likely to achieve its legitimate purpose and 
that the purpose cannot be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 
To further develop the paradigm, consider the following 
evenhanded-in-application statutes: (8) evenhanded with small 
adverse impact on interstate commerce and small benefit to the 
State; (9) evenhanded with small adverse impact on interstate 
commerce and large benefit to the State; (10) evenhanded with 
some adverse impact on interstate commerce and some benefit 
to the State; (11) evenhanded with large adverse impact on 
interstate commerce and little benefit to the State. The statutes 
in scenarios (8), (9) and (10) would be upheld under the 
Unitary Framework Step 2(a) because the challenger would have 
great difficulty in meeting its burden of proving that the harm 
caused by the statute to interstate commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the benefits gained by the State. Statute (11) may 
well be the rare case where the measure is struck down under 
Step 2(a), so long as the challenger proves that the burden 
imposed by the statute is indeed clearly excessive in relation to 
the benefits gained by the State. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Generations of law students, judges, practicing lawyers, and 
legal commentators have struggled to understand exactly what 
the Supreme Court does when it decides cases involving the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. Dormant-commerce-clause 
HeinOnline -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 465 1997-1998
No.2] Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause 465 
doctrine clearly is a complex constitutional area that defies easy 
explanation. Even various Supreme Court Justices have 
characterized the Court's doctrine as "hopelessly confused," "a 
quagmire," and, at the very least, "not predictable." 
This Article has attempted to clarify matters. It provides a 
single, comprehensive "Unitary Framework" for analyzing the 
Supreme Court's dormant-commerce-clause jurisprudence, 
making it at once more cogent and accessible. The Unitary 
Framework exposes the hidden order of the Court's current 
approach to dormant-commerce-clause questions and 
incorporates it with leading scholarly commentary into one 
functionally coherent, consistent approach, thus bringing order 
and improved certainty and predictability to the Court's 
dormant-commerce-clause doctrine. 
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